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Between Rock and a Hard Place: Polygraph
Prejudice Persists After Scheffer
ROBIN D. BAROVICKt
INTRODUCTION
Seventy-six years ago, in Frye v. United States,' the
D.C. Circuit held, in a two-page decision, that a crude
precursor to the polygraph had not gained "general
acceptance"3 in the scientific community and thus could not
be admitted into evidence.4 With that summary dismissal,
the court effectively cast the polygraph into desuetude, with
its reliability in the judicial, if not the popular, mind, falling
tJ.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 2000. 1
gratefully acknowledge the generous assistance and guidance of Major Carol L.
Hubbard, Air Force Legal Services Agency; SUNY at Buffalo Law School faculty
members, Prof. Charles Ewing, Prof. Sarah Herbert, and Prof. Janet Lindgren;
and Antoine J. Polgar for his editorial advice and encouragement.
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. In Frye, the defense attempted to admit results of a systolic blood
pressure deception test as exculpatory evidence, and presented scientific
testimony that blood pressure would rise when the subject lied. Id. at 1013. See
generally J.E. Starrs, A Still-Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States, 27 J.
FORENSIC Sci. 684 (1982) (providing details concerning Frye's confession and his
attempt to repudiate it by offering results of the polygraph's primitive precursor
which indicated he was telling the truth when he denied committing the crime.
Frye was found guilty of second degree murder and served eighteen years in
prison before being paroled).
3.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained [general acceptance] in the
particular field in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
4. See id.
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somewhere between snake oil and Tarot cards.5 Despite the
Supreme Court later overruling Frye, and thus establishing
a new federal standard for admissibility of scientific expert
evidence,6 the Court in 1998 refused to consider the
polygraph as anything more than an illegitimate offspring
of the scientific revolution. Finally, in United States v.
Scheffer,7 the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to the
longstanding anti-polygraph stance evinced by American
courts!
It was as if time had stood still for seventy-five years.
While American courts have generally exerted themselves
to keep pace with the latest scientific technology,9 the courts
5. One noted critic of certain types of polygraph techniques, psychologist
David T. Lykken, has written, "The lie detector has no more business in the
court room than a psychic or a deck of Tarot cards." David T. Lykken, The Lie
Detector and the Law, 8 CRIM. DEF. 19, 26 (May-June 1981). For a discussion on
different methods employed by various cultures to ascertain whether a person is
telling the truth, see, e.g., Richard H. Underwood, Truth Verifiers: From the Hot
Iron to the Lie Detector, 84 KY. L.J. 597 (1995-1996) (taking a negative view of
the 'lie detector' as the latest in a long history of theories and gadgets purported
to measure truthtelling).
6. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993);
infra notes 37, 46, and Section Ill-C.
7. 523 U.S. 303 (1998). Scheffer was the Court's first direct pronouncement
on the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Other polygraph cases have come
before the Court in the last seventy years. The Court denied certiorari in two
cases. See Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967 (1982); Masri v. United States, 454
U.S. 907 (1977). In other cases it made its ruling on other grounds. See, e.g.,
Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding that a state's failure to
disclose that a witness had failed a polygraph test did not deprive the defendant
of Brady material); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (finding that once a
defendant was informed of his right to have counsel present at a polygraph
examination and had waived that right, the police were not required to again
advise him of his rights before questioning him at the same interrogation
regarding the polygraph results).
8. See DAVID L. FAIGmAN, ET AL., I MoDERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE--THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMoNY 554 & n.5, § 14-1.0 (1997) ('Polygraphy, as
indicated by its being the subject behind the Frye rule, has had a long and
mostly troubled history in American courts. Throughout the twentieth century,
courts have been, at best, skeptical of polygraph tests, and at worst and more
usual, hostile to them.").
9. The courts have ruled on a variety of scientific technologies. See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (ruling on admissibility
of spectrographic analysis of voice); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th
Cir. 1970) (discussing neutron activation analysis); Commonwealth v. Cifizzari,
492 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1986) (ruling on bitemark evidence). Furthermore, the
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have carved an unusual niche for the polygraph,"° where its
scientific basis, along with its technological advances since
1923," count for naught. In this context, the Scheffer
holding is anomalous, and deserves close inspection.
In Scheffer, the Supreme Court reversed a decision by
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 2 and upheld the
constitutionality of Military Rule of Evidence 707," which
dictates a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence in military
court-martial proceedings. 4 Airman Edward Scheffer had
attempted to introduce exculpatory polygraph evidence and
challenged Military Rule of Evidence (MRE) 707 as an
unconstitutional infringement on his right to present a
courts have addressed the psychological realm. See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 68
F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995) (ruling on repressed memories); State v. Dumlao, 491
A.2d 404 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (discussing battered child syndrome); State v.
Marks, 647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982) (discussing rape trauma syndrome); State v.
Martens, 629 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio App. 3d 1993) (addressing post-traumatic stress
disorder).
10. "In the succeeding decades [since Frye], many courts treated the early
decision as if it established that polygraph results were inadmissible regardless
of any improvements in the technology." JOHN WILLiAm STRONG, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, § 206, at 913 & n.44 (4th ed. 1992). James A. Matte opined that
judges often misunderstand the technique, and compound that ignorance with
outdated polygraph test results taken on old instruments, a combination that
dictates inadmissibility. See JAMES ALEXNDER MATTE, FORENSIC
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY USING THE POLYGRAPH 563 (1996).
11. In 1995, Dr. William J. Yankee, the Director of the Department of
Defense Polygraph Institute, the nation's foremost academy for training
polygraph examiners, stated, "The period between 1986 and the present has
been one of unparalleled advances in the Psychophysiological detection of
deception testing procedures and processes." PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 8-2C (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1998); see also
William J. Yankee, The Current Status of Research in Forensic
Psychophysiology and Its Application in the Psychophysiological Detection of
Deception, 40 J. FORENSIC SCi. 63 (1995).
12. See United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 1996). The CAAF
decision was remarkable in that it was, up until that time, the highest level
court that found constitutional implications in refusing to allow a defendant to
present polygraph evidence. The court limited its holding to exculpatory
evidence offered to rebut an attack on the accused's credibility. See id. at 445.
13. MRE 707 provides, in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a
polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or
taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence." Mnm. R.
EvWD. 707.
14. See id.
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defense. 5 A fractured Court, in an opinion divided into a
four-justice plurality, a four-justice concurrence, 17 and a
lone dissent,8 held that MRE 707 did not unconstitutionally
abridge that right. The Justices agreed, 8-1, that because
the "scientific community remains extremely polarized
about the reliability of polygraph techniques," 19 MRE 707
was a "rational and proportional means of advancing the
legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence.""
Buttressed by their conclusion on the constitutional front
that MRE 707 did not "implicate any significant interest of
the accused,"2 ' the plurality and concurring justices did not
find that the accused's "defense was significantly impaired
by the exclusion of polygraph evidence."2 However, the
plurality lost their arguments that allowing polygraph
evidence would diminish the jury's role in making
credibility determinations and would spawn excessive
collateral litigation.' Here, the concurring justices agreed
with Justice Stevens' sharp dissent in dismissing what had
been two often-used weapons in the anti-polygraph
arsenal.'
15. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 305 (1998).
16. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Souter joined. See Scheffer, 523
U.S. at 304-17.
17. Justice Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in judgment and filed
the opinion in which Justice O'Connor, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer
joined. See id. at 318-20.
18. Justice Stevens dissented and filed an opinion. See id. at 320-39.
19. Id. at 309 (citing FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 565 n. 14-2.0, at § 14.3.0
(1997)); see GIANNELLI, supra note 11, at 225-27; STRONG, supra note 10, at 909.
20. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 312.
21. Id. at 316-17.
22. Id. at 317.
23. Though numerous decisions have theorized about the devastating
impact that polygraph results would have on a jury, hard evidence has been
hard to come by. In McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 967 (1981), the Court noted that while technology has evolved, so has the
public's sophistication in dealing with it. "Scientific evidence... has become
more a part of the ordinary trial so that jurors may be more likely to use
polygraph evidence with discretion." Id. at 462; see STRONG, supra note 10, at
916 & n.63; Charles R. Honts & Mary V. Perry, Polygraph Admissibility
Changes and Challenges, 16 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 357, 366 (1992).
24. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 318-19 (finding that the polygraph does not
usurp the role of the jury and stating that he does not join Part II-C of the
plurality's opinion concerning collateral litigation). Interestingly, these two
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Despite what at first glance would appear to be an
overwhelming vote against the admissibility of polygraph
evidence, a closer reading of Scheffer reveals that a majority
of justices continue to harbor concerns about the
constitutionality and rationale of a per se rule forbidding
admissibility of all polygraph results, and have left the door
open for another challenge.
That this case arises from the military justice system
creates some unusual implications. While close similarities
exist between most of the Military Rules of Evidence25 and
Federal Rules of Evidence, many significant differences
exist, not the least of which is MRE 707.26 Both the court-
martial procedure and the statutory provision allowing the
President to promulgate MREs have no counterpart in
civilian jurisprudence.27 In addition, civilian courts have
traditionally deferred to military court decisions28 and to
arguments which were rejected by the Supreme Court were put forth as the
policy reasons for adopting Military Rule of Evidence 707. "In [the opinion of
the Drafters of the Military Rules of Evidence], polygraph evidence poses a real
danger of misleading, confusing, and wasting the court's time. The Drafters
believed that fact finders will view this evidence as infallible, unimpeachable, or
conclusive of trial issues which in turn will cause courts-martial to degenerate
into trials about polygraph machines, and court members into ignoring the
military judge's cautionary instructions." STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL.,
MmrrARY RULES OF EvWDENCE MANUAL 211 (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1996).
25. MRE 101 provides "If not otherwise prescribed in this Manual or these
rules, and insofar as not inconsistent or contrary to the Code or this Manual,
courts-martial shall apply: (1) First, the rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal cases in the United States District Courts .... "
SALTZBURG, supra note 24, at 5. However, the MREs are the primary source of
evidentiary law for military practice. See id. at 1.
26. The Federal Rules of Evidence have no equivalent rule to MRE 707
regarding polygraph inadmissibility. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 323.
27. The Supreme Court promulgates the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
are approved by Congress. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., MATERIALS FOR THE
STUDY OF EVIDENCE 5-7 (1983). The President, as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces, promulgates the MREs pursuant to Article 36(a), U.C.M.J. See
10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1994). Congress had no part in drafting the MREs.
28. See Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43 (1976). Concerning the matter
of civilian court deference to the military court system, the Navy-Marine Corps
Appellate Division, in its amicus brief in support of the Respondent (Scheffer),
argued that, particularly on the constitutional question presented, a civilian
court must undertake an analysis of the military's interests as well as
constitutional principles. They urged deference to and affirmance of the decision
by the court below (the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces) as being in the
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Presidential and Congressional decision making in the
military context.29 Still, military courts can and do apply
civilian case law.' Despite the military's separate and
specialized legal system, the "military accused"°O still enjoys
many of the protections provided by the Constitution. 2
Indeed, in some contexts, military members enjoy greater
protections than their civilian counterparts.-3
Though acknowledging Presidential authority to
promulgate the MREs, the plurality, concurring and
dissenting justices analyzed Scheffer's constitutional and
evidentiary arguments in a civilian setting, employing
civilian rather than military case law.' Accordingly, this
best position to analyze the military's interests in matters of military justice.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of United States Navy-Marine Corps Appellate
Defense Division in Support of Respondent at 2, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
29. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768-73 (1996); Weiss v.
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 167 (1994); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,
447-48 (1987); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
30. See United States v. Ruth, 42 M.J. 730 (1995) (applying Daubert
standards in holding that handwriting analysis was not a scientific technique
and did not depend on factors governing admissibility of expert scientific
testimony).
31. Military terminology for defendant, specifically defined as "[olne against
whom charges have been preferred for an offense under the Code." EDWARD M.
BYRNE, MILITARYLAW 744 (3d ed. 1981).
32. The Supreme Court's opinions
[cloncerning the Constitution's application to the military justice
system have exhibited a theme of extending constitutional rights to
service members without limitation, except where necessary due to the
unique character of the military .... While the President and Congress
may establish rules for courts-martial... it is axiomatic that neither is
free to disregard the Constitution when acting in the area of military
affairs.
Brief of the United States Army Defense Appellate Defense Division as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 22, 23 Scheffer (No. 96-1133); see also
Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) (holding that "the plain
language of the Constitution... should be controlling on the subject of court-
martial jurisdiction"); Barney F. Bilello, Judicial Review and Soldiers' Rights:
Is the Principle of Deference a Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465
(1989).
33. Article 31, U.C.M.J. protects a member against compulsory self-
incrimination, even if not in custody. See 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1994); see also MATTE,
supra note 10, at 562 ("Our military justice system is replete with examples of
safeguards for the rights of military accused which are not available to their
civilian counterparts.").
34. See generally United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
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Note focuses on Scheffer's applicability outside a military
context, since the precedent established in civilian life by a
military court-martial applying Military Rules of Evidence
would be minimal.
In the context of civilian case law, the Scheffer opinion
countered recent Circuit Court decisions permitting
polygraph evidence in federal courts. 5  This trend
accelerated following the Supreme Court's 1993 Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.36 decision, which held
that the Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 702,"
controlled admissibility of scientific expert evidence in
federal courts.38 Before Daubert, scientific evidence had
been admitted only if it could successfully overcome the
"general acceptance" standard set forth in Frye.39 For more
than seventy years, when confronted with an issue of
polygraph admissibility, federal and state courts often
formalistically applied the Frye "general acceptance"
mantra, and, genuflecting at the Fryean altar, refused "to
reconsider whether the polygraph had obtained general
acceptance among psychophysiologists."4 ° The great
35. See infra pp. 1701-03 and accompanying notes.
36. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
37. Rule 702 reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R.
EVID. 702. Military Rule of Evidence 702, concerning "Testimony by Experts,"
contains exactly the same wording as Federal Rule of Evidence 702: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." MI. R. EVID. 702.
38. Courts agree that "Daubert applies to polygraph techniques." FAIGMAN,
supra note 8, at 560 & n.49.
39. See supra note 3.
40. James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph
Admissibility After Rock and Daubert 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 369.
Psychophysiologists study the relationship between psychological processes and
bodily reactions. They measure the physiological reactions of people in
controlled situations and from a knowledge of the situation and the stimulation
provided, can make inferences about the psychological processes the individual
is experiencing. The polygraph measures those physiological reactions. As
Honts and Perry elucidated, "[I1t is important to note that there is no one
polygraph technique. There are a great many polygraph techniques known by
many names, although they all have certain characteristics in common." Honts
1539
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majority of courts categorically ruled that polygraph
evidence was inadmissible,4' with only two exceptions.42
Daubert appeared to have revolutionized the standard,
holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the
Frye rule.43 Reading Rule 702 in a more liberal light, the
& Perry, supra note 23, at 358.
41. In the overwhelming majority of cases after Frye that involved the
polygraph, "courts relied on Frye's general acceptance test as the basis for
excluding testimony about polygraph examinations. The general rule emerged
that evidence of a polygraph examination was per se inadmissible." Edward J.
Imwinkelried & James R. McCall, Issues Once Moot: The Other Evidentiary
Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory Polygraph Examinations, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1997).
42. The Eleventh Circuit admitted polygraph evidence as early as 1989 after
holding in United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (1989), that polygraph
evidence could be admitted where the parties stipulated in advance as to the
circumstances of the test and as to the scope of its admissibility. Four years
before Daubert, Piccinonna charted new evidentiary territory by interpreting
FRE 702 and finding that a complete bar to polygraph evidence was no longer
defensible. The Piccinonna court pointed to the tremendous advances that had
occurred in the field of polygraphy, its widespread use in military and law
enforcement, and cited that in over 92% of cases, "a properly administered
polygraph test is a highly effective way to detect deception." Id. at 1533 & n.12.
In State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975), the New Mexico Supreme Court
allowed polygraph results, treating them no differently than other types of
scientific evidence. Dorsey required that the procedure be reliable, the operator
be competent, and that the polygraph tests on the subject be valid. Id.
Subsequently, New Mexico incorporated these requirements, further articulated
in case law, by adopting a state rule of evidence in 1983 (N.M. R. EVID. § 11-
707). See infra notes 231-32.
43. Prof. Edward J. Imwinkelried, an expert on scientific evidence, posited
in a 1981 law review article that the American legal system was entering a new
stage in the evolution of scientific evidence, dominated by questions of weight
rather than admissibility. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the
Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific
Evidence, 23 WM. & MARYL. REV. 261 (1981). Though Daubert would be decided
more than a decade later, he noted that the courts even then reflected a
liberalizing trend in scientific evidence, given the "less than enthusiastic" view
of Frye, which had already been subjected to a "drumbeat of criticism" by
knowledgeable commentators. Id. at 264. In his article, he anticipated Sixth
Amendment constitutional challenges for exclusion of scientific evidence. See id.
at 267. Frye has been characterized as an "historical test rather than a scientific
test," where "the nature of the general acceptance test almost necessarily builds
in a substantial lag time between the advent of a new, valid scientific technique
and the admission of testimony based on the technique." EDWARD J.
IMWELRMD & NORMAN M. GARLAND, EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE - THE
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Court accorded more discretion to the trier of fact, and held
that if the district court judge, acting as a gatekeeper,"
deemed scientific evidence relevant and reliable,45 it could
be admitted.46 The Court provided a list of factors to assist
the judge in making that determination.47 Only one of the
factors reflected whether the scientific technique used had
gained the widespread acceptance of the competent
scientific community. Oddly, however, when confronted
with whether polygraph results could be admitted into
ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INTRODUCE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE § 13-7
(2d ed. 1996).
44. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
The gate the judge keeps is that of Rule 104(a), where, faced with a proffer of
expert scientific testimony, the judge must determine, at the outset, "whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Id. at 592. Rule
104(a) provides, in relevant part: "Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... " FED. R. EVim.
104(a).
45. In a scientific context, validity refers to a test's accuracy, the ability to
measure what it says it is measuring. Reliability refers to reproducibility, or
consistency of results. When referring to the polygraph, "Reliability is
important, but the polygraph debate really centers around the test's validity [its
ability to detect deception]." State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 763 & n.46 (Conn.
1997). This Note will use the non-scientific meaning of the term "reliability" to
denote the polygraphs accuracy in measuring what it purports to measure: the
percentage of cases where a person's guilt or innocence is accurately
determined. See infra note 203 (regarding "evidentiary reliability").
46. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its Daubert standard for scientific
evidence more recently in General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), where
it applied an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court judge's ruling that
scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable. The Court cleared up a Daubert
ambiguity more recently in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, - U.S. __, 119
S.Ct. 1167 (1999), by holding that Daubert's gatekeeping obligation applied not
only to scientific testimony, but to all expert testimony.
47. Though declining to set forth a definitive checklist, the Daubert Court
listed several factors that federal judges could consider as guidelines when
faced with determining whether to admit expert scientific testimony under FRE
702: (1) whether the theory/technique had been tested; (2) whether the
theory/technique had been subjected to peer review and publication (a process
by which other scientists could detect substantive flaws in methodology); (3) the
technique's known or potential rate of error; (4) whether standards controlling
the technique existed and had been maintained; (5) whether the
theory/technique had gained a widespread level of acceptance within the
relevant scientific community. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
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evidence, the Scheffer Court dispensed with a Daubert
analysis and reverted to the 1923 Frye "general acceptance"
standard in the guise of a reliability argument.48
The Scheffer decision thus maintained a consistency
with its Frye progenitor in preserving longstanding
prejudice49 against polygraph admissibility. Despite a rate
of polygraph accuracy ranging from 70 to 90%,"° the
Supreme Court, joined by a dwindling number of circuits"'
48. The plurality and concurring judges expressed concern about polygraph
reliability throughout Section H-A of the Scheffer decision, supported by
citations to studies and cases that questioned or challenged polygraph accuracy.
They espoused circular reasoning- because the polygraph was not reliable, it
was not generally accepted, and it was not generally accepted because it was
unreliable.
49. An oft-quoted 1975 decision captured the flavor of the popular prejudice
against the polygraph. The decision expressed fear that a jury would imbue the
polygraph with "an aura of near infallibility akin to the ancient oracle of
Delphi." United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975). A
Seventh Circuit opinion voiced hostility to the polygraph in stating, "[Jiudges
loathe the specter [sic] of trial by machine, wherein each man's sworn testimony
may be put to the electronic test." United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779, 785
(7th Cir. 1977). Twenty years later, one of the Scheffer Amicus Curiae termed
the polygraph "a class of evidence that is inherently dangerous to justice." Brief
Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of
Petitioner at 1-2, Scheffer (No 96-1133). Another polygraph critic, Leonard
Saxe, a Brandeis University psychologist, claimed that it made no more sense to
tell jurors about polygraph evidence than to tell them about the suspect's
astrological chart. See David G. Savage, Let Trial Judges Decide-High Court
Rejects a Per Se Rule on Polygraph Evidence, 84 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (June 1998).
Honts & Perry observed, "Public information, and very often disinformation, on
the field of polygraphy virtually mandates the use of an expert witness if for
nothing else then to dispel the myths about polygraphy emanating from the
popular media and from overly zealous supports [sic] and detractors." Honts &
Perry, supra note 23, at 363. Even military court decisions had been divided on
the polygraph. See United States v. Rodriguez, 37 M.J. 448 (C.M.A. 1993)
(reversing a conviction of a master sergeant who testified that he had never
used drugs). The government had been permitted to introduce polygraph
evidence that he had been deceptive when denying knowingly using drugs. See
id. In reversing the conviction, the court said that given the government's
failure "to establish the reliability of this weapon of devastation," its results
were improperly admitted. Id. at 453.
50. See Bennett L. Gershman, Lie Detection: The Supreme Court's Polygraph
Decision, N.Y. ST. B. J., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 34 (citing MOENSSENS, INBAU, &
STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES, § 14.09, at 712 (3d ed. 1986)).
51. See infra notes 254-55, 257.
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and a majority of state courts," maintained the decades-
long stance of many American courts that singled out the
polygraph among various types of scientific evidence as a
thing apart, a "pariah,""3 while other less reliable scientific
evidence has either been frequently admitted or held to less
stringent standards.' Proponents and opponents alike cite
52. Twenty-eight state courts plus the District of Columbia exclude
polygraph evidence; fifteen states admit polygraph evidence by stipulation of
the parties; two states allow polygraph evidence to be admitted in certain
proceedings and Mississippi and New Mexico allow admission of polygraph
evidence, with restrictions, at trial. See Brief of the State of Connecticut and 27
States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4-5, Scheffer (No. 96-1133);
infra note 261.
53. McCall, supra note 40, at 380 (citing Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 183
Cal.Rptr. 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).
54. Justice Stevens cited a study by J. Widacki and F. Horvath. See United
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 333-34 & n.24 (1988). This study discussed how
polygraph evidence was compared to fingerprinting, handwriting analysis, and
eyewitness identification. See Widaki & Horvath, An Experimental
Investigation of the Relative Validity and Utility of the Polygraph Technique
and Three Other Common Methods of Criminal Investigation, 23 J. FORENSIC
Sci., 596, 596-600 (1978). When inconclusive results from the tests were
excluded, the fingerprinting expert correctly resolved 100% of cases, the
polygraph expert 95%, the handwriting expert 94% and eyewitness 64%. See id.
When inconclusive results were factored in, the polygrapher resolved 90% of
cases correctly, the handwriting expert 85%, the eyewitness 35% and the
fingerprinting expert 20%. See id.; Scheffer, supra. The study concluded, "[Olur
findings do support the claim of practitioners that relative to other methods the
polygraph technique is particularly valuable for resolving criminal
investigations." Widacki & Horvath, supra, at 600. For a discussion of these test
results, see STAN ABRAMS, THE COMPLETE POLYGRAPH HANDBOOK 184 (1989) and
MATTE, supra note 10, at 5 ("The aforesaid study supports Reid and Inbau's
statement.., that the accuracy of the psychophysiological veracity (P)
examination is commensurate with and even superior to most of the presently
approved forms of evidence."). One scholar pointed out how prejudice against
the polygraph translated legally by observing that the Frye standard had not
been invoked to assess certain types of expert scientific testimony such as
ballistics, intoxication tests and X-rays (allowing admissibility), while it had
been consistently applied to the polygraph, rendering it inadmissible. See Honts
& Perry, supra note 23, at 375 ('The continued widespread exclusion of
polygraph tests appears to lie in a continued distrust of the polygraph based on
concerns about logical relevance. This distrust is despite the fact that polygraph
tests have been demonstrated to be more accurate than many forensic
techniques routinely admitted by the courts.") (citation omitted); McCall, supra
note 40, at 377 (highlighting other scientific evidence authorized for legal
admission, which "raise substantial accuracy or validity questions"); Mark
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the same studies by well-established scientists to confirm
their positions on polygraph reliability or unreliability.55
The literature on polygraphs is "compendious, contentious,
and of uneven quality."" Still, despite the ongoing
polygraph reliability controversy, a number of Circuit
Courts, spurred by Daubert, have reassessed their previous
exclusion of polygraph evidence and have admitted it,
usually pursuant to stipulation or the trial judge's
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67
IOWA L. REV. 879, 884-85 (1982); Donald F. O'Conner, Jr., The Polygraph:
Scientific Evidence at Trial, 37 NAVAL L. REV. 97, 106 (1988) (discussing
examples of scientific evidence, such as neutron activation analysis, based on
scientific principles less reliable than polygraphy, but accepted at trial).
55. Polygraph proponents and opponents will either laud the results or
criticize the methodology of the same study in an effort to prove their premise
that the polygraph is or is not reliable. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING: A
RESEARCH REVIEW AND EVALUATION 5 (1983) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
Opponents of polygraph reliability point to the OTA REPORT concluding that
"when used in criminal investigations, the polygraph test detects deception
better than chance, but with error rates that could be considered significant."
Id. The OTA REPORT is reprinted in its entirety in 12 POLYGRAPH 198-319
(1983). The Governmens Brief cited the OTA REPORT for the proposition that
"no overall measure of single, simple judgment of polygraph testing validity can
be established based on available scientific evidence," and proceeded to
enumerate various studies that acknowledged the raging debate on polygraph
accuracy. Brief for the United States at 19-21, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
Proponents cite results that could be interpreted as in their favor, such as "the
conclusion about scientific validity can be made only in the context of specific
applications," which keeps the door to polygraph evidence open simply because
it does not discount it altogether. IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 43, § 6-
5, at 174 (quoting OTA REPORT at 4). Proponents also vigorously criticize the
methodology of the sixteen year old study as using an improper statistic and
treating inconclusive test results as errors. "As such, the petitioner's reliance
upon the conclusion of the OTA Study-that polygraph tests in criminal
investigations have significant error rates-is undermined by the study's
suspect statistic." Brief for the Respondent at 22-23, Scheffer (No. 96-1133); see
Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 14-15, Scheffer (No. 96-1133). Another bone of
scientific interpretive contention is how the results of surveys among members
of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, designed to quantify the level of
polygraph acceptance among members of the relevant scientific community, are
interpreted. See infra notes 238-39.
56. STRONG, supra note 10, at 908 & n.24; see, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli,
Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 895 (1998).
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discretion.57
This Note argues that if the Scheffer Court had applied
a Daubert analysis to polygraph evidence, it would have
been adjudged sufficiently reliable. On that basis, the per se
rule excluding polygraph evidence would not have served
any legitimate interest, since it would have prevented the
introduction of reliable evidence. The Court would then
have declared MRE 707 arbitrary and thus
unconstitutional. As a result, the Court would have
remanded the case to the trial court, and ordered a Daubert
hearing so that Scheffer's counsel could attempt to lay a
foundation for the introduction of exculpatory polygraph
evidence.58 While Scheffer's facts did not prove compelling
enough to wrest at least the concurring justices from their
anti-polygraph position, one need not wander too far afield
to predict that the time will soon be ripe for another
challenge to polygraph inadmissibility in the Supreme
57. See generally United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995)
(admitting polygraph evidence on a case-by-case basis; concluding its per se rule
against polygraph admissibility did not survive Daubert); United States v.
Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208 (6th Cir. 1995) (admitting polygraph evidence if
stipulated to by both parties before the test is administered and trial judge
determines that requirements of FREs are met); United States v. Pulido, 69
F.3d 192 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that polygraph admissibility under FREs is left
to the sole discretion of the trial judge); United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that polygraph admissibility should be applied on a
case-by-case basis). Some courts, however, have found that Daubert did not
change their approach to polygraph evidence. See United States v. Black, 831
F.Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("After evaluating the standard set forth in
the Daubert case, premised on Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Court believes that nothing in Daubert would disturb the settled precedent that
polygraph evidence is neither reliable nor admissible.").
58. The CAAF decision described what proof was necessary to lay a proper
foundation for polygraph evidence. See United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442,
446-47 (C.A.A.F. 1996). The proponent had to establish "that the underlying
theory-that a deceptive answer will produce a measurable physiological
response-[was] scientifically valid,... that the theory [could] be applied to the
[accused's] case..., that the examiner [was] qualified, the equipment worked
properly and was properly used, and that the examiner used valid questioning
techniques." Id. If the Daubert hearing resulted in the admission of the
exculpatory polygraph data, this evidence would have negated the mens rea
element of the knowing ingestion of methamphetamine charge, giving credence
to Scheffer's claim of innocent ingestion. The panel members would then assess
the proper weight to be given this evidence, and it may have been enough to
reverse Scheffer's conviction on this charge.
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Court. Should the anti-polygraph climate continue to abate,
as reflected by post-Daubert Circuit Court decisions
allowing polygraph evidence, and by the Court's
neutralizing two main arguments from the anti-polygraph
arsenal,59 the Court may finally realize that counsel should
at least be allowed to establish a foundation for polygraph
admissibility in this, our technological age.
II. ANALYSIS OF SCHEFFER DECISION
A. Facts
In March, 1992, Edward Scheffer, an airman stationed
at March Air Force Base, California, volunteered to work as
an informant for the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (OSI). The OSI informed Scheffer that, as a
condition of his role as informant, he would be required to
provide urine samples and submit to polygraph
examinations on a random basis. On April 7, 1992, OSI
requested such a urine sample from Scheffer. On April 10,
before the urinalysis result was known, Scheffer submitted
to a polygraph examination conducted by a government
polygrapher. In the opinion of the polygraph examiner, "the
test 'indicated no deception' when [Scheffer] denied using
drugs since joining the Air Force."" On April 30, Scheffer
left the base and was absent without leave until May 13,
when he was arrested and returned to the base. Shortly
thereafter, the urinalysis report, dated May 20, indicated
that Scheffer tested positive for methamphetamine.'
Scheffer was tried by general court-martial "on charges
of using methamphetamine, failing to go to his appointed
place of duty, wrongfully absenting himself from the base
for 13 days, and, with respect to an unrelated matter,
uttering 17 insufficient funds checks."2
During the court-martial, Scheffer testified in his own
defense, relying on an "innocent ingestion"' theory. He
59. See infra notes 94, 105, and 128-30.
60. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 306 (1998).
61. See Scheffer, 44 M.J. at 443.
62. 523 U.S. at 306.
63. See generally United States v. Graham, 50 M.J. 56 (C.A.A.F. 1999)
(discussing an innocent ingestion defense).
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denied that he had knowingly used drugs while working for
OSI. On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to
impeach Scheffer's testimony based on prior inconsistent
statements. The government's closing arguments referenced
Scheffer's lack of credibility. The prosecution argued, "He
lies. He is a liar. He lies at every opportunity he gets and he
has no credibility. Don't believe him. He knowingly used
methamphetamine, and he is guilty of Charge II" and
"[t]he only way you can find him not guilty of these
offenses, is if you believe his story."" The Military Judge
instructed the panel members67 that "[ulse of a controlled
substance may be inferred to be wrongful in the absence of
evidence to the contrary."'
Because MRE 707 precluded polygraph testimony, the
trial judge denied Scheffer's motion to introduce the
exculpatory polygraph result. Unable to buttress his
defense of innocent ingestion, Scheffer was convicted.69 On
appeal, the United States Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed.70 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces (CAAF) reversed,7' holding that MRE 707
was unconstitutional, since "a per se exclusion of polygraph
evidence offered by an accused to rebut an attack on his
credibility, without giving him an opportunity to lay a
foundation under Mil.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert violates his
Sixth Amendment right to present a defense."72 The CAAF
noted that "the truth-seeking function [of adversary
64. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306.
65. 44 M.J. at 444.
66. Respondent's Brief at 14, Scheffer (No. 96-1133). "Twenty-one times, in
closing argument alone, [Scheffer] was called a liar or [the Government] said
his credibility was lacking ...." Transcript of Oral Argument Before the
Supreme Court at 42, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
67. Military terminology for a jury at a court-martial. "A person subject to
the Code who is detailed to a court-martial has to determine whether an
accused has been proven guilty and to determine an appropriate sentence if the
accused is found guilty." BYRNE, supra note 31, at 751.
68. Respondent's Brief at 14, Scheffer (No. 96-1133) (emphasis added).
69. Scheffer was "convicted on all counts and was sentenced to a bad-
conduct discharge, confinement for 30 months, total forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade." Scheffer, 523 U.S. at
307.
70. See United States v. Scheffer, 41 M.J. 683 (C.C.A. 1995).
71. See United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
72. Id. at 445.
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proceedings] is best served by keeping the door open to
scientific advances," 73 and although the court could not
determine whether the polygraph technique constituted the
type of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
envisioned by Rule 702 and Daubert,"4 that inquiry would
never be answered if the accused was not allowed to lay the
foundation for such testimony.
The Supreme Court reversed the CAAF holding.75
B. Ruminations on Rock
Divergent interpretations of the holding in Rock v.
Arkansas lie at the heart of both the Scheffer plurality's
and dissent's constitutional arguments concerning the per
se rule against polygraph admissibility. Rock was the latest
in a line of modern cases that articulated the precedence of
a defendant's constitutional rights to present a defense over
evidentiary rules requiring reliability7. Rock also evidenced
the Court's clear trend away from per se rules in an effort
to assess facts on a case by case basis.78
In Rock, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional an
Arkansas evidentiary rule that excluded all hypnotically-
73. Id. at 446.
74. United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 1995).
75. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308.
76. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
77. See ALFREDO GARCIA, Tim SIX AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITCAL PERSPECTIE 127 (1992).
78. The Supreme Court has manifested a decided aversion to per se rules in
a variety of contexts, as indicated in recent decisions. See also IMVINKELRIED &
GARLAND, supra note 43, at 494 (noting that the accused's right to present
evidence "is accentuating the modem trend to place greater stress on logical
relevance and the concomitant tendency to devalue exclusionary evidentiary
rules."); see, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (declining to apply a
per se rule of home protection in the context of the exclusionary rule); Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (rejecting three per se rules of
employer liability or immunity in Title VII cases); Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (holding tax exemption
clause which singled out institutions serving mostly in state residents for
beneficial tax treatment, pursuant to a per se rule, unconstitutional); Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (rejecting per se rule concerning voluntariness of
consent to search, and emphasizing fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (reversing a Florida Supreme
Court decision which adopted a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus
always constituted a seizure).
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refreshed testimony.79 The case concerned a domestic
dispute between Vicki Lorene Rock and her husband.
During the altercation, Mrs. Rock grabbed a gun, which
discharged, killing her husband. Mrs. Rock could not
remember the details of the killing. Following hypnosis
sessions, she recalled that her finger had not been on the
trigger, and that the gun had discharged when her husband
seized her arm. An expert witness corroborated that the
gun had malfunctioned. However, Mrs. Rock, the only
eyewitness, was prevented from testifying about the
accidental nature of the gun discharge because of an
Arkansas per se evidentiary rule prohibiting all
hypnotically refreshed testimony.
Rock stood for the right of an accused to call witnesses
whose testimony was material and favorable to the defense.
The right of the accused to testify in her own defense was a
subset to the broader constitutional guarantee. The
Supreme Court held that the exclusion of Mrs. Rock's
testimony violated her Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense, by preventing her from calling "witnesses in her
favor." ' The Court also expressed a strong aversion to per
se rules against the admission of evidence, which did not
allow for flexibility in individual cases. Commenting on
Arkansas' blanket rule that prohibited hypnotically
refreshed testimony, the Rock Court said, "[a] State's
legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not
extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an
individual case.""
In grappling with the issue, the Court conceded that
"there is no generally accepted theory to explain the
[hypnosis] phenomenon, or even a consensus on a single
definition of hypothesis."" Despite its amorphous scientific
foundation and acknowledged potential for unreliability,
the Court found that hypnosis had been recognized as an
important investigative tool.' Given that finding, the Court
79. See 483 U.S. at 61.
80. See id. at 53.
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 61.
83. Id. at 59.
84. Hypnosis had been credited with obtaining investigative leads that had




was loathe to reject its evidentiary value altogether, since
the circumstances presented by Rock provided a compelling
argument against a per se rule. In an attempt to legally
circumscribe the admissibility of hypnotically-induced
evidence, the Court pointed out that implementing various
procedural safeguards could reduce inaccuracies
engendered by the nebulous nature of hypnosis. The Court
recommended utilizing "traditional means of assessing
accuracy, [such as] ... corroborating evidence,... expert
testimony,... cross-examination... and cautionary
instructions."5 Though not endorsing hypnosis, the Court
found the facts in Rock compelling enough to announce that
a per se rule forbidding a defendant's hypnotically-
refreshed testimony did not serve a state's legitimate
interest. The State had failed to show that "hypnotically
enhanced testimony is always so untrustworthy and so
immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility
that it should disable a defendant from presenting her
version of events .... 6
The Rock Court acknowledged that there may be
limitations on admissibility of evidence, since "a defendant's
right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but
rather is subject to reasonable restrictions."87 In this
context, a defendant's interest in presenting relevant
evidence would be subject to accommodating "other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process."88 These
restrictions would not unconstitutionally infringe on the
defendant's "right to present a defense so long as they
[were] not 'arbitrary' or 'disroportionate to the purpose
they are designed to serve.' ' They would be arbitrary if
they encroached upon "a weighty interest of the accused.""
85. Rock, 483 U.S. at 61. Other safeguards mentioned by the Rock Court
included: adopting rules providing that hypnosis affects credibility, not
admissibility; allowing individualized inquiries in each case; and establishing
procedural prerequisites in order to reduce risks associated with hypnosis. See
id. at 59 & n.16.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 55. The Scheffer plurality emphasized the importance of limiting
evidentiary rules by citing additional cases on point, including Taylor v. Illinois,
484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
88. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295.
89. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Rock, 483
U.S. at 56).
90. Id. (citations omitted).
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The Court adjudged the interest of the accused in
presenting a defense, underscored by her right to testify in
her own defense, a weighty interest. In sum, the Court
reasoned that "the evidence was admissible because it was
not so inherently unreliable that a jury could not rationally
evaluate it."9
C. Scheffer Plurality Opinion
However, even the constitutional shadow cast by Rock
over per se exclusionary rules of evidence was not enough to
dissuade the Scheffer plurality from its holding that MRE
707 was constitutional. As the bedrock of its constitutional
reasoning, the Scheffer plurality chose to focus on Rock's
ancillary argument that relevant evidence can be limited by
reasonable restrictions," and concluded that MRE 707 did
serve a number of non-arbitrary, legitimate interests, such
as "ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at
trial, preserving the court members' role in determining
credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the
primary purpose of the trial."'
The plurality's constitutional argument hinged upon
polygraph reliability (because the five concurring and
dissenting justices dismissed the two other legitimate
interests they had cited). Echoing Frye, the plurality
pointed to the lack of consensus on polygraph reliability,
observing that "the scientific community remains extremely
polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques. ""
They noted the wide divergence on polygraph reliability
estimates, with proponents claiming accuracy in the 87-90%
range, and detractors citing reliability of little better than
91. MWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 43, § 2-4, at 52.
92. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308.
93. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
94. The two legitimate interests cited by the Court were preserving the
jury's function of determining the weight and credibility of witnesses, and
avoiding collateral litigation. See id. at 313-14. One commentator wryly noted
that "Justice Thomas... concluded that the avoidance of litigation over issues
other than the guilt or innocence of the accused was a legitimate consideration
of judicial economy." John T. WinemiUler, Note, Criminal Law-Constitutional
Right to Present a Defense-Per Se Rules Against the Admission of Exculpatory
Polygraph Evidence, 66 TENN. L. REV. 331, 344 (1998).
95. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309.
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50%." Though acknowledging that some Circuit Courts
have begun to move away from excluding polygraph
evidence following Daubert, the plurality observed that
most state courts continue to exclude polygraph evidence.
Because the scientific community continues to express
doubts about polygraph reliability, the Court asserted that
MRE 707 barring polygraph admissibility was "a rational
and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest
in barring unreliable evidence."97
Based on this line of reasoning, it was but a short step
for the Scheffer Court to distinguish the three cases upon
which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces relied,"
demonstrating that they did not support a constitutional
right to introduce polygraph evidence "even in very narrow
circumstances."" But how were they to circumvent Rock? To
distinguish it, the plurality subtly shifted emphasis.
Instead of highlighting Rock's salient holding that a state
per se rule barring certain evidence violated the defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense, the Scheffer
plurality interpreted the violation of that right as having
deprived the jury of the defendant's testimony, which
infringed Mrs. Rock's "interest in testifying in her own
defense."'
96. At the upper range of polygraph reliability, the plurality cited ABRAMS,
supra note 54, at 190-91 (1968), and for the lower range, they cited Iacono and
Lykkin's article, The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The
Case Against Polygraph Tests, in FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 629. Lykken is a
noted critic of certain types of polygraph testing procedures. See, e.g., DAVID T.
LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD: USES AND ABUSES OF THE LIE DETECToR (2d.
ed. 1998).
97. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 312.
98. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
99. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315.
100. Id. Under the Sixth Amendment, the accused's right to present a
defense-to call witnesses-is more fundamental than the right to testify in
one's own defense. See Brief for the Respondent at 9-10, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
"The Sixth Amendment, on its face, is silent about an accused's right to testify
on his own behalf." Id. at 9. At the time the Constitution was adopted, the
common law rule prevented a defendant from testifying in his own behalf, but
allowed the defendant to call witnesses. Id. Rock considered the right to testify
in one's own defense as a subject to the more fundamental right to present a
defense by calling witnesses. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1985);
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); see infra Section II-A.
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In a one-paragraph summation of the substantive
constitutional issue under review, the plurality concluded
that "Rule 707 does not implicate any significant interest of
the accused."'0 ' Because Scheffer had been able to testify in
his own defense and present factual evidence, the plurality
found that he was "barred merely from introducing expert
opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility." 2 Though
the exclusion of exculpatory polygraph evidence went to the
heart of the accused's case, buttressing his innocent
ingestion defense, where credibility was of utmost
importance, the Court regarded its exclusion as
insignificant.
Still, the plurality expressed some misgivings.
Backtracking on their position that the polygraph was
unreliable ab initio, they muted their criticism by noting
that the degree of polygraph reliability may fluctuate
depending on a variety of factors. Since "there is simply no
way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph
examiner's conclusion is accurate,.., certain doubts and
uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams.
Individual jurisdictions therefore may reasonably reach
differing conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence
should be admitted."' 3 The plurality thus maintained the
status quo, allowing those Circuits and state courts which
admit or exclude polygraph evidence to continue to do so,
indicating they were limiting the Scheffer holding. Though
they did not invite another challenge, as did the concurring
justices, they did not discourage it, which the 8-1 holding on
polygraph admissibility would otherwise have signaled.
D. Concurring Opinion
The four concurring justices provided the four member
plurality with a total of eight votes to uphold the military's
per se rule against admissibility of polygraph evidence.
They reasoned that since the polygraph was unreliable, it
was not unconstitutionally arbitrary to uphold a per se rule
forbidding its admission.' However they did not agree with
101. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 316-17.
102. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 312.
104. The concurring justices observed, "The continuing good-faith
disagreement among experts and courts on the subject of polygraph reliability
1553
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the plurality that polygraph evidence would interfere with
the function of the jury or that it would spawn collateral
litigation.10
5
The tenor of the concurring justices' opinion on the
reliability issue was tentative at best. They clearly
harbored doubts about the wisdom of upholding the per se
exclusionary rule, and anticipated that in the future, they
may decide differently. Justice Kennedy wrote, "I doubt,
though that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, and some
later case might present a more compelling case for
introduction of the testimony than this one does.""' He
indicated another concern that may have prompted the
concurring justices to decide with the plurality, despite
their reservations. "If we were to accept respondent's
position, of course, our holding would bind state courts, as
well as military and federal courts."' 7 The concurring
justices were demonstrably reluctant to make such a
sweeping change in so many jurisdictions. This position was
likely underscored by the fact that twenty-eight State
Attorneys General submitted an amicus brief in support of
the Government's position against polygraph
admissibility. 8
Justice Kennedy acknowledged two troublesome
shortcomings in the plurality's opinion. Referring to
counsels against our invalidating a per se exclusion of polygraph results...
Id. at 318.
105. The concurring opinion did not discuss the collateral litigation issue,
but on the issue of the polygraph impinging on the province of the jury, Justice
Kennedy criticized the principal opinion as "overreaching" when it rested its
holding on the ground that "the jury's role in making credibility determinations
is diminished when it hears polygraph evidence," and expressed surprised that
the plurality had invoked the ultimate issue argument. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Brief of the State of Connecticut and 27 States as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Scheffer (No. 96-1133). Describing polygraph evidence as
"unreliable and overly prejudicial," the Brief warned that allowing such
evidence would "obliterate the years of experience that the States have had
with this type of evidence and force them to abandon their well-developed policy
considerations for excluding it." Id. at 2-3. Among the policy reasons cited were
that the validity of test results had not been established, trial court resources
utilized to address and supervise such evidence rendered it too burdensome
(lengthening trial time), and the polygraph usurps the function of the jury to
assess credibility. See id.
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Daubert, he acknowledged that "[tihough the considerable
discretion given to the trial court in admitting or excluding
scientific evidence is not a constitutional mandate... there
is some tension between that rule and our holding today."'0 9
Realizing that Daubert did not necessarily require the
inclusion of scientific evidence, the concurring justices
observed that its exclusion could have constitutional
implications in a criminal case, and that a Daubert analysis
would adversely impact a per se rule excluding an entire
domain of scientific testimony. Though those implications
were evident in Scheffer, for the concurring justices they
only created a tension, not a constitutional victory, for the
accused.
Secondly, Justice Kennedy joined the dissent in
pointing to the "inconsistency between the government's
extensive use of polygraphs to make vital security
determinations and the argument it makes here, stressing
the inaccuracy of these tests,"10 a point so obvious that he
only made a glancing reference to it."'
E. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens' forceful dissent strongly criticized the
Court's reasoning and conclusions. He questioned whether
the President had complied with statutory authority when
he promulgated MRE 707, and tentatively determined that
he did not."' Not resting his dissent on that ground, he
embarked upon an analysis of MRE 707."1 Focusing on the
Sixth Amendment issue that an accused has a
constitutional right to present a defense, he cited numerous
109. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 318.
110. Id.; see infra pp. 1679-80.
111. See infra notes 132-35. In his dissent, Justice Stevens commented on
this irony. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 337-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 320 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 10
U.S.C. § 836(a) (1994) (allowing the President to promulgate evidentiary rules
"which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States District Courts ... ."). This issue was not briefed in the courts
below. It appears settled that the MEs can be viewed as "sufficiently
procedural or evidentiary to withstand challenge." SALTZBURG, supra note 24, at
3d. But see, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 3 M.J. 230 (C.M.A. 1977).
113. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 320 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that this
statutory issue had not been briefed).
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Supreme Court opinions which described that right as
fundamental to the due process of law,... and noted that the
Court had previously "recognized the potential injustice
produced by rules that exclude entire categories of relevant
evidence that is potentially unreliable.""5 He commented on
the recent trend where strict, categorical exclusionary rules
in rulemaking, constitutional and non-constitutional
decisions have been "replaced by rules that broaden the
discretion of trial judges to admit potentially unreliable
evidence and to allow properly instructed juries to evaluate
its weight.""6
Justice Stevens observed that the holding in Rock was
directly on point with Scheffer, given that both cases
concerned per se rules against admission of evidence which
impacted on a defendant's ability to present a defense. In
Scheffer, given that the accused's credibility was at issue,
and his "uncorroborated testimony is certain to be less
persuasive than that of a third-party witness,"11 the per se
rule impaired a meaningful opportunity to present his
innocent ingestion defense. Stevens reasoned that since
"evidence of... [an] innocent state of mind is critical to a
fair adjudication of criminal charges,"" and because the
exclusion of the polygraph test results may have affected
the outcome of the trial, it "unquestionably 'infringed upon
a weighty interest of the accused'.""' Against that standard,
the per se rule against polygraph inadmissibility was
unconstitutional.
Justice Stevens also delved into an analysis of
polygraph reliability. He cited studies establishing its
accuracy at 85 to 90%."0 Noting that a variety of factors
114. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
115. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Washington,
388 U.S. at 20-21); see also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1958);
Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335 (1892).
116. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 331.
118. Id. at 332 (citing United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 691-92 (2d Cir.
1990)); see Imwinkelried & McCall, supra note 41, at 1058, 1060-62.
119. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. See id. (citing The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph
Techniques: The Case for Polygraph Tests, in FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 572;
ABRAMS, supra note 54, at 190-91).
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such as "the examiner's integrity, independence, choice of
questions, or training in the detection of deliberate
attempts to provoke misleading physiological responses" 2'
may factor into a test's result, he advocated disposing of
those concerns during the adversary proceeding by
"vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof."1"2
Endorsing the plethora of safeguards available to the trial
court to place polygraph evidence in the proper legal
context (similar to the Rock Court's handling of hypnosis),
he contended that the potential problems associated with
polygraph admissibility fell "far short of justifying a blanket
exclusion of this type of expert testimony."2 '
In one of his more interesting arguments that
highlighted the anomalous evidentiary status of the
polygraph, Stevens asserted that "There is no legal
requirement that expert testimony must satisfy a
particular degree of reliability to be admissible."" In the
context of the word "particular," he referred to another
Supreme Court case where expert testimony concerning a
defendant's future dangerousness, even if wrong "most of
the time," was routinely admitted in determining eligibility
for the death penalty.' He also referred to a study where
121. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Polygraph opponents
emphasize the danger that people could be taught to undermine polygraph test
results by employing a variety of physical or mental countermeasures. The
government's brief mentions hypnosis (an interesting point, given its supposed
unreliability as articulated in Rock), ingestion of drugs and subtle muscular
movements as confounding polygraph results. Yet the brief goes on to admit
that "no good evidence as to how well these countermeasures work under real
life conditions" has been amassed. Brief for the United States at 25, Scheffer
(No. 96-1133). While acknowledging that people can be trained to used
countermeasures to fool the polygraph, Justice Stevens emphasized that that
possibility was not enough to justify a per se ban. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 335, n.25
(Stevens, J., dissenting). For further discussions on the issue of
countermeasures, see, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 54, at 185-86; FAIGMAN, supra
note 8, at 576-79, 595; GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, at 229-30;
LYKKEN, supra note 96, at 230-32, 273-77, 292-93; see infra note 247.
122. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)).
123. Id. at 334.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-901 (1983). In Barefoot, the Court
came to the opposite conclusion on a per se rule of admissibility, and refused to
bar evidence that was clearly unreliable. Although the American Psychiatric
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customarily admitted handwriting analysis, eyewitness
identification, and fingerprint identifications proved to be
less accurate than polygraph evidence in particular
situations. 6 In raising this issue, Justice Stevens echoed
the views of numerous commentators who have referred to
the uneven caliber of scientific evidence admitted by courts,
despite an absence of proven scientific validity and
reliability.17
Stevens dismissed the arguments that admitting
polygraph evidence would interfere with the role of the jury
to make credibility determinations, and would spawn
excessive collateral litigation. He expressed confidence in
the ability of the jury to properly weigh all evidence,
particularly when buttressed by proper instructions, adding
that "testimony of disinterested third parties [the polygraph
examiner] that is relevant to the jury's credibility
determination will assist rather than impair the jury's
Association (APA) in their amicus brief strongly rejected predictions of future
dangerousness, the Supreme Court stated, "We are no more convinced now that
the rule of the APA should be converted into a constitutional rule barring an
entire category of expert testimony... Neither petitioner nor the Association
suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future
dangerousness, only most of the time." Id. at 899, 901. This almost flippant
attitude towards accuracy, in a case where the defendant faced the death
penalty as a result of a psychiatrist predicting future dangerousness, makes a
mockery of the Court's apparent requirement of extremely high reliability for
the polygraph. In addition, the Barefoot Court expressed confidence in the
adversary process as the cauldron where reliable and unreliable evidence could
be sorted out. See id. at 901.
126. See Widacki & Horvath, supra note 54, at 596-600.
127. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid
the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEImnP. L. REV. 55, 56-57, 66 (1998)
(pointing out that certain "time-honored" prosecutorial tools such as
fingerprinting have found their way into courtrooms with hardly any
demonstration of their scientific bases, and that virtually no empirical data on
error rates is available for such routinely admitted evidence as voiceprints and
handwriting analysis); Lloyd C. Peeples, III et al., Note, Exculpatory Polygraphs
in the Courtroom: How the Truth May Not Set You Free, 28 CUIM. L. REV. 77,
95-96 (1997-1998) (discussing how courts should exclude rape trauma syndrome
evidence for the same reasons that courts routinely refuse to admit polygraph
evidence) [hereinafter Exculpatory Polygraphs]; Brief of the United States Army
Defense Appellate Division as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5,
n.6, Scheffer (No. 96-1133) (noting that other expert evidence of controversial
scientific reliability has been admitted in courts, such as post-hypnotic
identification).
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deliberations."'28 Stevens pointed out that the plurality's
misgivings about the potential for collateral litigation was
an "insufficient justification for a categorical exclusion of
expert testimony." If such critical testimony could be
excluded for that reason, "the right to a meaningful
opportunity to present a defense would be an illusion."
130
The collateral debates argument would be better addressed
in a rule "prescribing minimum standards that must be met
before any test is admissible, but it surely does not support
the blunderbuss at issue."
13 1
Justice Stevens also commented on the juxtaposition of
military and civilian rules of evidence and criminal
procedure. He pointed out that the "lie detector plays a
special role in the military establishment. " 13' As a result,
the military is more favorably disposed to its admissibility,
particularly since it has long utilized the polygraph and
"maintains very stringent standards for polygraph
examiners." ' The irony of the military arguing against
128. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Honts &
Perry, supra note 23, at 366-67 (noting that "[sltudies tend to show that juries
are more inclined not to give extraordinary weight to polygraph evidence," a
finding supported in both field and laboratory studies); IMWINKELRIED &
GARLAND, supra note 43, § 6-5, at 174.
129. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 338 (citing N.M. R. EvIn. § 11-707).
132. Id. at 323. Stevens cited Reports from the Department of Defense
Polygraph Program, which indicated that between 1981 and 1997, the
Department of Defense had conducted over 400,000 polygraph examinations to
resolve counterintelligence, security, and criminal issues from State and federal
law enforcement rely extensively on the polygraph. Id. at 324-25.
There are 400 polygraph examiners on the federal payroll alone and
many more working for state and local law enforcement. The fact that
they rely on polygraph results in making important decisions about
people's lives and liberty raises serious questions about their credibility
when they argue the polygraph is so unreliable that the accused in a
criminal case should not be allowed even to let the jury hear about it.
Charles W. Daniels, New Frontiers in Polygraph Evidence: Law & Tactics,
CHAMPION, July 1997, at 16, 62. See also Honts & Perry, supra note 23, at 358
(observing that inadmissibility of polygraph evidence "seems to be a most
peculiar situation in that we have a nearly universally applied law enforcement
technique that, more often than not, has been rejected as reliable evidence by
our courts of law."). Fifty-seven countries administer polygraph examinations.
See MATTE, supra note 10, at 5.
133. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Department
of Defense Polygraph Program, Annual Polygraph Report to Congress, Fiscal
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polygraph admissibility was not lost on Justice Stevens."'
He commented that "the Government is in no position to
challenge the competence of the procedures that it has
developed and relied upon in hundreds of thousands of
cases."
, 35
In a conclusion arguably more balanced than that of the
plurality, Justice Stevens admitted that the government's
concerns "would unquestionably support the exclusion of
polygraph evidence in particular cases," but again
reaffirmed his opinion that the government's concerns were
"plainly insufficient" to support a blanket exclusion in all
cases.
Year 1996, pp. 14-15). Outside the trial context, admission of unstipulated
polygraph results "has become relatively commonplace. In hearing motions and
other nontrial proceedings, lower court judges in a number of jurisdictions have
been allowed to hear evidence of polygraph results." McCall, supra note 40, at
378-79. Further, law enforcement has used polygraph testing for crime
investigation for decades; private industry has used testing to detect employee
theft and screen job applicants and the federal government expanded its use of
polygraph testing for pre-employment screening purposes. "The rapid growth of
polygraph testing both within and outside the federal government led to federal
polygraph legislation in the late 1980s." Id. at 379-80.
134. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 337-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 339. The Department of Defense maintains the highest standards
for polygraph examiners in the nation, providing a curriculum that meets the
requirements of a master's degree of study. The minimum requirements for
Department of Defense polygraph examiners are
(1) Be a United States Citizen. (2) Be at least 25 years of age. (3) Be a
graduate of an accredited four-year college or have equivalent
experience that demonstrates the ability to master graduate-level
academic courses. (4) Have two years of experience as an investigator
with a Federal or other law enforcement agency... (5) Be of high
moral character and sound emotional temperament, as confirmed by a
background investigation. (6) Complete a Department of Defense-
approved course of polygraph instruction. (7) Be adjudged suitable for
the position after being administered a polygraph examination
designed to ensure that the candidate realizes, and is sensitive to, the
personal impact of such examinations.
Department of Defense Polygraph Program, Annual Polygraph Report to
Congress, Fiscal Year 1996, at 14-15.
136. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 338 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He also admitted the
same logic would be relevant to admit inculpatory polygraph evidence, and
pointed out that according to certain studies, exculpatory tests are more reliable
than inculpatory ones. See id. at 338 n.29.
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III. CRITICISM OF SCHEFFER DECISION
A. The Constitutional Issues
Before President Bush promulgated Military Rule of
Evidence 707... prohibiting admissibility of polygraph
evidence, the CAAF had recognized the due process
implications of a polygraph inadmissibility rule and had
been one of the more liberal jurisdictions in allowing
polygraph evidence."3 8 In United States v. Gipson, the Court
permitted the accused to attempt to lay the foundation for
admission of favorable polygraph evidence.'39 Should it be
admitted, the expert at trial would opine, '"hether the
examinee was being truthful or deceptive in making a
particular assertion at the time of the polygraph exam."' °
With that opinion as a basis, the fact finder could decide
whether to infer that the examinees' trial testimony was
also truthful.' A later military case concerning polygraph
admissibility, United States v. Williams, broached but did
not address the constitutional issue.' The Williams Court
anticipated that it might have to rule on polygraph
reliability in determining whether the automatic exclusion
under MRE 707 "violates the accused's constitutional trial
rights."'1
137. 3 C.F.R. 334, 336 (1992).
138. See United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246 (1987).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 253.
141. See id.; see also McCall, supra note 40, at 391 (stating that the analysis
supplied by the new Rule "cites no scientific or field studies and refers only to
[opinions denying polygraph admissibility] handed down prior to Gipson.").
142. 43 M.J. 348 (1995). Williams held that an accused did not have the
right to introduce polygraph results without first taking the stand and
testifying. See id. at 355. In not reaching the issue whether automatic exclusion
of polygraph evidence violated the accused's constitutional rights, the court
concluded its decision by asking whether polygraph evidence was collateral
evidence of the same constitutional magnitude as the types of evidence the
Supreme Court has constitutionally required. See id. That question was left
unanswered. See id.
143. Id. at 353. While the Williams Court declined to comment on the
constitutional implications of the per se exclusion on the federal level, at the
state level, courts have found that per se rules did not violate a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights. See e.g., State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (Conn. 1997);
Perkins v. State, 902 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App. 1995).
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In cases where the credibility of the accused is at issue,
testimony that supports the accused's credibility assumes
utmost importance. The Sixth Amendment's Compulsory
Process Clause'" and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause'45 form the basis of the right to present evidence in
one's defense. A per se rule against the admissibility of
exculpatory polygraph evidence impedes the accused's
ability to persuade the members of his or her veracity.' In
Scheffer's case, the accused's credibility on the knowing
ingestion of methamphetamine charge was integral to his
defense. 47 In a line of cases spanning thirty years, the
Supreme Court ruled that evidentiary or procedural rules
excluding potentially exculpatory evidence implicated a
defendant's constitutional rights and struck the rules
down.'48 However, when faced with a similar evidentiary
rule applied to the polygraph, the Court eschewed that
constitutional lineage, ignored Daubert, and issued the
anomalous Scheffer decision.
In addition to Rock, the plurality and dissent alike
relied upon Washington v. Texas' and Chambers v.
Mississippi50  in formulating their constitutional
arguments. 5' In Washington, a state statute had prevented
co-defendants from testifying for one another.'52 The
Supreme Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights had been violated since "the State arbitrarily denied
144. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST,
amend. VI.
145. "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law...."U.S. CONST. amend. V.
146. See Brief for Respondent at 14, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
147. See id.
148. See infra notes 149-50. The Scheffer holding appears to counter a
statement made by two legal scholars who evaluated the Supreme Court's
decisions concerning a defendant's rights over the last thirty years. 523 U.S. at
303-05. "[1It is still fair to say that the Court has 'consistently' protected the
accused's constitutional right to present important exculpatory evidence."
IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 43, at 493.
149. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
150. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
15L See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308,315-17 (plurality opinion), 326-30
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. 388 U.S. at 14, 16.
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[the accused] the right to put on the stand a witness who
was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events
that he had personally observed."53 In so doing, the
Washington Court "gave new impetus to the right of
compulsory process by equating it with the right to present
a defense and by characterizing compulsory process as a
'fundamental element of due process of law.' ,154 This
decision served to revitalize the Compulsory Process Clause
which had lain dormant since the early days of the republic,
"by placing it on an equal footing with such other Sixth
Amendment guarantees as the right to
confrontation... .""' The gravamen of the Washington
decision anticipated the advent of the liberal Federal Rules
of Evidence. Washington's holding emphasized that the
truth would be reached by allowing testimony of all
competent persons who would provide relevant and crucial
evidence even if the testimony might be somehow
tainted.!es The jury would be responsible for ferreting out
how much weight and credibility to give the testimony." '
The third case distinguished by the Scheffer plurality,
Chambers v. Mississippi, concerned a due process violation
where two state rules prevented the defendant from
impeaching his own witness and excluded testimony from
three people to whom the witness had confessed to the
crime. In further cementing a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights, Chambers stood for the proposition that
a rule of evidence that "prevents a criminal defendant from
presenting a complete defense by excluding material parts
of his testimony is constitutionally impermissible."'59
However, in circumscribing the breadth of the Chambers'
holding, the Scheffer plurality confined Chambers' holding
to "the 'facts and circumstances' presented in that case...,
[refusing to broaden it to] stand for the proposition that the
accused is denied a fair opportunity to defend himself
whenever a state or federal rule excludes favorable
153. Id. at 23.
154. GARCIA, supra note 77, at 116 (quoting Washington, 338 U.S. at 19).
155. Id.
156. See Washington, 338 U.S. at 22, 23.
157. See id. at 22 (citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)).
158. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1973).




Once again the Scheffer plurality subtly reinterpreted
constitutional precedent in order to distinguish its holding
from the case at bar. Regarding exculpatory polygraph
results, the Court viewed the matter solely as an
evidentiary issue, rather than a constitutional one, which
allowed it to narrowly construe Chambers and Washington,
if not Rock.'
In further distinguishing Scheffer from the three
Supreme Court precedents 6 ' upon which the CAAF had
relied, the plurality argued that the witnesses who were
prevented from testifying in Rock, Chambers and
Washington would have provided relevant details of the
charged offense (i.e., they were at the scene of the crime)."3
Accordingly, the failure to admit such testimony under
various state evidentiary or procedural rules prevented the
defendant from presenting a defense, and implicated
constitutional issues. With a surprisingly thin analysis, the
Court maintained that because Scheffer took the stand in
his own defense and presented his version of events, the
holdings in Chambers, Washington and especially Rock
were inapposite."M At that point, it was a simple step for the
Scheffer Court to conclude that "unlike the evidentiary
rules at issue in those cases, Rule 707 does not implicate
any significant interest of the accused."'65 In minimizing the
importance of Scheffer's inability to present exculpatory
polygraph evidence,'66 the Court concluded that Scheffer's
defense was not significantly impaired by the per se rule,
that the rule was not arbitrary 67 and that his constitutional
160. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 316 (1998).
161. See id. at 308, 315-17.
162. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
163. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 46; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 287; Washington, 388
U.S. at 15-16.
164. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 316-17.
165. Id.
166. The Court observed that Scheffer was merely barred from "introducing
expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility." Id. at 317.
167. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 56. For discussions on the constitutional
implications of MRE 707 in the military, see John J. Canham, Jr., Military Rule
of Evidence 707: A Bright-Line Rule That Needs to be Dimmed, 140 MIL. L. REV.
65 (1993);); First Lt. John A. Carr, Note, The Admissibility of Polygraph
Evidence in Court-Martial Proceedings: Does the Constitution Mandate the
1564 [Vol. 47
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challenge resultantly failed. 6 '
This invalid syllogism lies at the heart of the plurality's
holding on the constitutional issue. It raises numerous
questions about the allowable scope of expert testimony
offered by a defendant. Was it the Court's position that
unless the defendant's eyewitness testimony is precluded by
a per se rule, all other preclusions are constitutional? That
the presentation of credibility or expert evidence to buttress
the defense is not protected under the Sixth Amendment?
Since the Court allowed the prosecution's urinalysis and
disallowed the defendant's polygraph results, what
standard were they using to admit scientific evidence as
material fact?'69 What does material fact, or factual
evidence, mean?7 ' Since all scientific tests (urinalysis,
polygraph, and fingerprints) must be interpreted by
experts, is there a constitutionally cognizable difference
between the physical results from a polygraph and from
urinalysis? How can excluding expert opinion testimony
that bolsters the credibility of a defendant (in a case where
the main charge concerns the defendant's intent or
knowledge, and no other witness can testify to that intent),
Gatekeeper? 43 AF. L. REV. 1 (1997); Timothy M. Hughes, Note and Comment,
United States v. Scheffer: What Is Left of the Polygraph in Criminal Trials?, 10
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 653, 663-69 (1998).
168. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 317.
169. This issue was not appealed by Scheffer from the trial level.
170. For a definition of "material," see Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759, 770-71 (1988). Concerning factual evidence, the plurality (joined by the
concurring justices) did not regard polygraph results as factual evidence (where
a witness could testify to events personally observed), but rather as expert
opinion testimony. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 316-17. Justice Stevens, on the
other hand, opined at length on how the results of the polygraph test
constituted "independent factual evidence." Id. at 331. Quoting Dean Wigmore,
Justice Stevens discussed how conduct and utterances "may constitute factual
evidence of a 'consciousness of innocence'.. ."-and exclusion of such test results
would infringe upon "a weighty interest of the accused." Id. at 331-32. Though
Justice Thomas (author of the plurality opinion) is technically correct that only
the polygrapher's opinion of truthfulness or deception is generally offered into
evidence at trial (and not the "factual" blood pressure etc. readings from the
polygraph instrument), this view is unduly limited in scope. Id. Factual
evidence is not merely restricted to eyewitness testimony about the crime itself,
but may be presented about other matters if it is relevant, material, and
reliable. See id. Arguably, Justice Stevens' approach, equating Scheffer's
polygraph results to "consciousness of innocence" appears more reasoned on this
issue. Id.
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be viewed as a minimal imposition on the accused? In
Scheffer, exclusion of polygraph evidence did strike at the
heart of the defense's case. The plurality's tortured and
shocking interpretation of a defendant's rights, where
formulaic limitations on one's rights are upheld at the
expense of substance, strips the Sixth Amendment
Compulsory Process Clause of its protections.
One commentary on the constitutional implications of
this case noted "[w]hat seems more likely is that the Court
meant to exclude from [constitutional] protection only
expert testimony bearing on credibility. In other words,
only polygraph evidence and a narrow range of similar and
possibly questionable expert testimony are constitutionally
insignificant under Scheffer." It would appear that once
again, the Court singled out the polygraph, allowing neither
a constitutional nor a scientific challenge to disturb the
seventy-five year prejudice against its admissibility. The
Scheffer Court's restrictive view of the rights of criminal
defendants prompted one writer to observe, "[t]he Sixth
Amendment's right of Compulsory Process is meaningless if
a state rule of evidence can categorically serve to withhold




The plurality essentially upheld the per se rule against
polygraph admissibility based on the flawed premise that
because the polygraph was accorded a mixed reception in
the scientific community, it was not generally accepted and
therefore unreliable. That premise supported their
conclusion that MRE 707 excluding polygraph evidence was
not arbitrary." The constitutional issue hinged specifically
on the scientific foundation of polygraph reliability, and
generally on the standard used in Federal Court to admit
scientific evidence under FRE 702, articulated in Daubert.
It is noteworthy that the plurality all but omitted a Daubert
analysis of the polygraph. It is also noteworthy that a
majority of the justices questioned the per se rule and
inferred that under a Daubert analysis, a different result
171. Exculpatory Polygraphs, supra note 127, at 109.
172. Id. at 109-10.
173. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309.
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might have been obtained.'
The plurality relegated its treatment of Daubert to a
footnote."6 There, although the Court referred to Daubert as
superceding Frye's general acceptance standard for
scientific evidence, the thrust of the plurality's observation
concerned the lack of constitutional challenges to excluding
polygraph evidence under the Frye standard.'76  The
plurality observed, "[nlothing in Daubert foreclosed, as a
constitutional matter, per se exclusionary rules for certain
types of expert or scientific evidence."'77 But because
Daubert did not discuss the matter, it could not foreclose it.
Also, because Daubert unequivocally liberalized the
admission of scientific evidence," which would conflict with
upholding a per se exclusionary rule, it appears as if the
Scheffer Court was attempting to indirectly limit Daubert in
a reversion to the overruled Frye standard.'79 That result
would likely have been acceptable to the Scheffer Court,
since after all, the source of the evidence in this case was
only the polygraph.
Why didn't the Court apply a Daubert analysis to the
polygraph?
C. Daubert's Holding
After determining that Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
and not Frye, provided the standard for admitting expert
scientific testimony in a federal trial, Daubert required that
the trial judge as "gatekeeper assess whether the
174. See id. at 318, 322.
175. See id. at 311 n.7.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. The Frye "'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the
'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony." Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1984)). Daubert was clear "[tihat [the] austere [Frye]
standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
should not be applied in federal trials." 509 U.S. at 589.
179. For a discussion that tracks how judges have been attempting to avoid
or evade Daubert in a "kind of back-door endorsement of Frye," see Beecher-
Monas, supra note 127, at 73.
180. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. The judge's role is as a gatekeeper under
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), focusing on preliminary questions of
1567
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expert's testimony was both relevant and reliable and could
thus be admitted. 8' The relevance prong echoes the theme
permeating all Federal Rules of Evidence: the evidence
must bear directly on the issue in dispute, and have a
tendency to make a material fact more or less probable
pursuant to Rules 401 and 402.182 In order to be helpful, the
testimony must be capable of being understood by a jury
and useful to them in making their decision. 8 ' The expert
testimony would not be admissible unless it proved relevant
to the facts of the case, what the court termed "fit."84
The Daubert reliability prong required that expert's
testimony be grounded in "scientific knowledge,"'85 which
would in turn provide a basis for the trial judge to
determine the evidentiary reliability, or trustworthiness, of
the testimony: "whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid."88 Rather
than emphasizing results, Daubert emphasized the
scientific rigor of the methodology and the techniques
employed in arriving at the conclusions.'87 Daubert thus
provided an opportunity for courts to rethink and re-
evaluate the evidentiary status of the polygraph, which
qualifications of witnesses and evidence, rather than a "screener" of evidence.
FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 533.
181. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
182. Rule 401 provides: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401. Rule 402 provides: "All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EviD. 402.
183. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
184. Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.
1985)). The relevancy inquiry required the expert testimony to be "sufficiently
tied to the facts of the case" to aid the jury in resolving the factual dispute. Id.
185. Id. at 590. Parsing the phrase into "scientific" and "knowledge," the
Court instructed that " 'scientific' implie[d] a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science," while " 'knowledge' connote[d] more than subjective
belief or unsupported speculation." Id. This grounding would provide the basis
for the evidentiary reliability the Court was seeking in juxtaposing legal and
scientific standards. See id.
186. Id. at 592-93.
187. See id. at 595. Here the Court assesses the evidence's "empirical
validity." Imwinkelried & McCall, supra note 41, at 1046.
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allowed the legion of studies concluded over past decades at
least to be assessed rather than dismissed offhand.
Though the Daubert Court did not provide a dispositive
test for admissibility of scientific expert testimony, it did
offer a nonexclusive checklist of five factors by which ajudge should assess reliability.'88 One of the Scheffer Amici
proposed that Daubert's applicability in a criminal case
would require that judges should additionally take into
consideration constitutionally-based protections when
applying Daubert reliability factors. 8 "[A] trial judge
should consider the nature of the purported exculpatory
evidence as an additional factor of the Daubert/Rule 702
expertise analysis," and in considering possible exculpatory
evidence, should accord it "more weight than other items on
the non-exclusive Daubert list."'90
Daubert incorporated the Frye "general acceptance"
standard as "widespread acceptance." 9 This factor became
one amongst many, losing its previous status as the
lynchpin. One commentator noted the Daubert acceptance
factor indicated more than a semantic twist, and in fact
provided a qualitative difference from the standard relied
upon in Frye. The Daubert Court limited the widespread
acceptance factor's applicability by noting that it did not
require, but did permit "explicit identification of a relevant
scientific community and an express determination of a
particular degree of acceptance within that community."'93
The Court left the quantitative degree of acceptance to be
188. See supra note 47.
189. See Brief of the Army Defense Appellate Division as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 23, Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (No. 96-1133).
190. Id.
191. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
192. Law Professor James R. McCall regarded the use of the "adjective
'widespread,' as opposed to 'general,'" as significant. McCall, supra note 40, at
400. Widespread implied that a "prevalent or widely diffused acceptance, rather
than a more universal level of acceptance [would] be adequate." Id. This "lower
level of acceptance" was consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence which
liberalized the admission of evidence. Id.
193. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)). Of course, how narrowly or broadly that 'community'
was defined became a source of heated controversy in the post-Daubert




determined on a case by case basis.' Other commentators
have noted the Daubert Court reduced general acceptance
from a "test to that of a pertinent factor." '
In applying a Daubert analysis to the polygraph, I will
analyze the factors strand by strand to demonstrate that
the polygraph would pass a Daubert test. Though our
nation's highest appellate court likely would not have
delved into an extensive review of polygraph studies
conducted over the past thirty-five years to determine if it
would finally pass scientific evidence muster, it could have
explored the issues, even in an abbreviated manner, as the
foundation for its constitutional analysis of MRE 707. Doing
so would have provided the basis for remanding the case to
the trial court.
1. Relevance. In assessing the relevance prong of
scientific evidence admissibility, the baseline inquiry is
whether the polygraph examiner's testimony is helpful to
the trier of fact in determining a fact at issue.' In cases
involving exculpatory polygraph admissibility, testimony by
an examiner as to whether the defendant indicated
deception or no deception in his or her answers is relevant
to a defendant's consciousness of guilt-or innocence-of the
crime at the time the test is given. 117 The jury would then
decide what weight to give the results in determining the
defendant's credibility. Some writers dispute the
polygraph's premise98 that deception can be indicated by
194. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
195. Imwinkelried & McCall, supra note 41, at 1054.
196. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
197. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 321, 331-32 (1998).
198. The premise holds that there is a definite relationship between lying
and certain emotional states, as well as between those emotional states and
changes in the body. See Ronald J. Simon, Adopting a Military Approach to
Polygraph Evidence Admissibility: Why Federal Evidentiary Protections Will
Suffice, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1055, 1058 (1994). If a person is threatened or
concerned about a stimulus or question, especially querying about the matter
under investigation, that concern will be expressed by measurable physiological
reactions the subject is unable to control and which can be recorded on a
polygraph instrument. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 884 (D.
N.M. 1995). The testing format changed over the years, beginning with
examiners using a "relevantlirrelevant" technique whereby they would ask
relevant questions about the incident under investigation and irrelevant
questions about non-threatening subject that would provoke true answers. This
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continuous and simultaneous measurements and recording
of various autonomic nervous system responses. 9' However,
a majority of commentators accept the underlying
hypothesis causing the reliability debate to revolve around
the polygraph's error percentage.' °
Since the interpretation of polygraph results
corresponds to a consciousness of guilt or innocence about
the alleged crime at the time of the examination, it is
relevant to the issues presented in the case under Rule
401,01 and admissible under Rule 402.202
2. Reliability. The Daubert reliability inquiry is much
more complicated than its relevance counterpart. 211 The
conclusions arrived at by polygraph proponents and
opponents are much more hotly contested. Studies often
indicate a wide divergence on polygraph error rates, with
proponents likely to ascertain high reliability and
technique has been generally discredited. See McCall, supra note 40, at 381. In
the 1960s, scientists developed the control question format. See Galbreth, 908 F.
Supp. at 844. Here, the examiner asks the subject an anxiety-producing
question (the control question) unconnected with, yet similar to, the issues
under investigation. See id. That question is geared either to provoke a lie, or
the subject is told to lie when answering. See id. The examiner follows the
control question with questions concerning the incident. See id. A comparison of
the person's responses to both types of questions is the critical criterion for
determining whether deception is indicated. See id. The pretest interview
between the examiner and subject is also a critical phase of the process. See id.
For a critical view of polygraph assumptions and techniques, see generally
David Gallai, Note, Polygraph Evidence in Federal Courts: Should It Be
Admissible? 36 Ai. CRIM. L. REV. 87 (1999); Timothy B. Henseler, Comment, A
Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the Wake of Daubert:
The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U. LAW REV. 1247, 1251 n.23 (1997).
199. A person generally cannot control autonomic responses such as blood
pressure and sweating of the palms. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 883 n.9. The
autonomic nervous system controls how the body adjusts to changes in
conditions, and is relatively impervious to voluntary control. See id.
200. See infra notes 217-24.
201. See supra note 182. Rule 401's relevance threshold is very low: the
standard of probability under the rule is "more ... probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. "Any more stringent requirement is
unworkable and unrealistic .... Dealing with probability in the language of the
rule has the added virtue of avoiding confusion between questions of
admissibility and questions of the sufficiency of the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401
advisory committee's note.
202. See supra note 182.
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opponents low reliability."4 No point is conceded. Each side
questions the other's methodology if the result is
unfavorable to that side's position. Analysis of the scientific
argument and conflicting findings is beyond the scope of
this Note. Suffice it to say that the debate continues to
rage.0 5 This everpresent controversy forms the backdrop
against which courts must attempt to evaluate this type of
scientific evidence. Daubert's five factors provide a roadmap
for those trial judges required to trudge through the thicket
of conflicting reliability studies to make an assessment of
polygraph admissibility.
a. Whether the theory/technique has been tested. The
term "psychophysiological detection' of deception or PDD
has been part of the scientific literature since 1921.
However, the term 'polygraph' was generally accepted."0 6
The basic theory of PDD "and the various techniques used
for the detection of deception have been put to numerous
scientific tests over the past 25 years."0 7 Since its early use
as a systolic blood pressure cuff on the arm of James Frye
in 1923, the polygraph has undergone extensive
refinement.2 8 Among the scientific advances in polygraph
technology has been computerized polygraph
instrumentation, scoring algorithms, formal quality
assurance and continuing education programs for
examiners. Numerous field and laboratory studies have
been conducted focusing on the various polygraph
techniques.210
b. Whether the theory/technique has been subjected to
203. In a legal context, reliability refers to accuracy, while in a scientific
context, reliability refers to consistency of results. In this section, the discussion
focuses on the legal definition of reliability. See supra note 45.
204. See supra notes 96, 120 and infra pp. 1694-95.
205. For example, see FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 565-633 and STRONG, supra
note 10, at 908-12.
206. Respondents Brief at 17 n.6, Scheffer (No. 96-1133) (citation omitted).
207. Brief of the Committee of Concerned Social Scientists as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 7, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
208. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989);
see also United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995).
209. See Respondent's Brief at 17 n.6, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
210. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 885-88.
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peer review. This factor goes hand-in-hand with whether the
technique has been tested: in the scientific community, once
a theory is tested, the researcher will publish the results in
scientific journals.21' Publication as a method of quality
control allows other scientists in the field to closely
scrutinize and replicate-or be unable to replicate-the
researcher's findings. Replicability tends to insure
reliability. The Committee of Concerned Social Scientists,
in their Amicus Brief on behalf of Scheffer, cited fifty-four
articles containing studies, surveys and evaluations of the
polygraph in their table of authorities.212 They claimed that
the "large number of original scientific studies published in
peer-reviewed scientific journals" indicated acceptance of
the polygraph technique."' They cited polygraph studies in
mainstream journals, including The Journal of Applied
Psychology, Psychophysiology, and The Journal of General
Psychology.214 The Brief described the stringent peer review
process, noting that "[alrticles which are not acceptable
within the scientific discipline covered by the journal are
simply not published in that journal," and that the
extensive publication "gives a clear indication that the
psychophysiological detection of deception is generally
accepted as valid science by the community of scientific
psychologists.""5
Polygraph reliability testing has been conducted for
decades. Often, published studies have generated pointed
criticism by scientists on the opposite side of the polygraph
divide, who claim the tests suffer from substantive
methodological flaws. The Committee of Concerned Social
Scientists engaged in such peer review criticism in their
Amicus brief, pointing out that the negative results of a
certain study on polygraph acceptability conducted by
polygraph detractors had been distorted by flawed
methodology.2"6
211. See Brief of the Committee of Concerned Social Scientists as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19-20, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
212. See Brief of the Committee of Concerned Social Scientists as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at iv-x, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
213. Id. at 19.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 19, 20.
216. See id. at 17 n.21. The Brief roundly criticized a survey of members of
the Society for Psychophysiological Research on polygraph acceptability by Dr.
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c. Known or potential rates of error of a scientific
technique. This factor sometimes tends to blend into the
widespread acceptance factor: if error rates in certain
scientific tests are significant, then the relevant scientific
community will not find the test results reliable and the
technique will not be accepted within the community. The
rate-of-error factor continues to generate heated debate on
polygraph reliability.217 Proponents generally claim that
polygraph accuracy rates hover around 90% or better.1 '
Detractors claim either that it is little more accurate than a
toss of a coin,219 or around 70%.22
Both proponents and opponents, as battle-hardened
soldiers of the polygraph admissibility wars, arm
William Iacono and David Lykken, outspoken critics of polygraph testing, as so
flawed and controversial that it could not be used for any substantive purpose.
See id. at 17-18. The Brief denounced the Iacono and Lykken methodology as
biased, by asking those who responded to make political and legal judgments
rather than scientific ones; how the sample of respondents was as a whole,
highly uninformed about the topic of polygraph examinations; how their
statistical choices made it impossible to compare surveys; how the survey,
represented as random, was not; and how Iacono and Lykken refused to make
their data available for reanalysis. See infra notes 246-47.
217. See STRONG, supra note 10, at 909-12.
218. See Brief of the Committee of Concerned Social Scientists as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14, Scheffer (No. 96-1133); Respondent's
Brief at 22, Scheffer (No. 96-1133); see also Canham, supra note 167, at 84;
Charles Robert Honts & Bruce D. Quick, The Polygraph in 1995 Progress in
Science and the Law, 71 N.D. L. REV. 987, 998 (1995); Honts & Perry, supra
note 23, at 360-62, 365; Imwinkelried & McCall, supra note 41, at 1055; James
A. Matte's compendium, supra note 10 (offering an extensive and exhaustive
review of polygraph studies conducted since the 1980's); David C. Raskin, The
Polygraph in 1986: Scientific, Professional and Legal Issues Surrounding
Application and Acceptance of Polygraph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 29, 43
(1986); Simon, supra note 198, at 1062-63; MOENSSENS, ET AL., SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, § 20.11 & n.1 (4th ed. 1995)
(referencing the accuracy of polygraph tests, the section on "The Detection of
Deception" cites a 1990 study by Ansley, "The Validity and Reliability of
Polygraph Decisions in Real Cases," Polygraph 19(3), 169-81, in which the
author reviewed eleven field studies conducted between 1980 and 1990,
involving 920 suspects, and reported that polygraph examiners were correct in
90% of their diagnoses, based on a limited analysis of chart responses);.
219. See The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The
Case Against Polygraph Tests, in FAIGmAN, supra note 8, at 629; see also OTA
REPORT, supra note 55, at 5, 97; Henseler, supra note 198, at 1297 n.233.
220. Henseler, supra note 198, at 1280 (citing David T. Lykken, The
Validity of Tests: Caveat Emptor, 27 Ju nlIETRICS J. 263, 265 (1987)).
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themselves with polygraph test results that fortify their
conclusions, and continue to fire salvos into the enemy
camp in the hopes of winning the end-game. Proponents
cite studies by Honts & Quick, Raskin, or Matte2 to prove
their point, while opponents cite studies by the Office of
Technology Assessment 222 and Professor Lykken.2"
Clearly, the issue of polygraph reliability remains at
the forefront of scientific inquiry and debate. It is the area
to which courts more often than not look when attempting
to decide upon admissibility."
d. Existence and maintenance of standards controlling
the technique's operation. Opponents have long pointed to
the lack of standardization of polygraph examiners as a
221. MATTE, supra note 10, at 121-29; Honts & Quick, supra note 218, at
997-98; Raskin, supra note 218, at 43. For a survey of the pro-polygraph
position, see The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The
Case for Polygraph Tests, in FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 565-82, 619-27, 629-31.
222. See generally OTA REPORT, supra note 55.
223. See LYEKEN, supra note 96; David T. Lykken, The Case Against
Polygraph Testing, in THE POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES, TRUTH AND SCIENCE 111, 117
(Anthony Gale ed., 1988); Lykken, supra note 220, at 265. For a survey of the
anti-polygraph position, see The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph
Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in FAIGmAN, supra note 8, at
582-618, 627-29, 631-33.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(citing United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1224 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
polygraph tests were not sufficiently reliable to warrant the admission of the
results in evidence); People v. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (IM. 1981) (stating
that "the primary obstacle in admission of polygraph evidence, stipulated to or
not, has continually and consistently been the instrument's disputed scientific
reliability.") (citations omitted); State v. Beard, 461 S.E.2d 486, 493 (W.Va.
1995) (stating that "we remain convinced that the reliability of such
examinations is still suspect and not generally accepted within the relevant
scientific community. Therefore, any speculation that our position in Frazier
regarding polygraph admissibility is in question due to the Daubert/Wilt
rulings is put to rest today.") (emphasis in original). But see United States v.
Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the "[c]urrent research
indicates that, when given under controlled conditions, the polygraph technique
accurately predicts truth or deception between seventy and ninety percent of
the time.") (footnote omitted) (citation omitted); United States v. Crumby, 895
F.Supp. 1354, 1358 (D.C. Ariz. 1995) (stating that "based on the evidence
presented by the parties, the Court finds that there has been a significant
increase in the reliability of polygraph evidence over recent years.").
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fatal flaw in the system."5 They recite that some states
have no licensing or training requirements for examiners."2
Justice Stevens noted that these concerns could be
addressed in pre-trial adversary proceedings on
admissibility of polygraph results.27 However, this concern
does not arise in the military, which maintains the highest
standards for polygraph examiners and operations in the
country. The Department of Defense Polygraph Institute
(DoDPI), which trained the polygraph examiner in the
Scheffer case, requires that "every polygraph in a criminal
case is reviewed by two levels of quality control, one at
operational field level by the field supervisor, and then at
the program's headquarters."29 DoDPI examiners are
required to undertake a rigorous study of "forensic
psychophysiology, and conceptual, abstract, and applied
knowledge that meet the requirements of a master's degree-
level of study."'°
For over fifteen years, New Mexico has been the only
state to formulate a rule of evidence allowing polygraph
results.2" That Rule of Evidence establishes high standards
for admission of polygraph evidence.2 Proponents often
point to New Mexico's successful experience with the
polygraph, now incorporated in statute, as maximizing
reliability of the technique and minimizing potential
scientific or legal snafus concerning admissibility.2" That
225. See Brief of the United States at 23-24, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
226. More than twenty states have licensing regulations. See United States
v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 892 (D.N.M. 1995); McCall, supra note 40, at 372.
227. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 333-34 (1998).
228. See id. at 323-24 n.5.
229. Brief of the Committee of Concerned Social Scientists as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent at 28, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
230. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 323-24 n.5.
231. See N.M. R. EVID. § 11-707.
232. The rule provides that polygraph evidence is admissible only when the
following conditions are met: the examiner must have had at least five years
experience in conducting polygraph tests and twenty hours of continuing
education within the past year; the examination must be tape recorded in its
entirety; the polygraph charts must be scored quantitatively in a manner
generally accepted as reliable by polygraph experts; all polygraph materials
must be provided to the opposing party at least ten days before trial; and all
polygraph examinations conducted on the subject must be disclosed. See id.
233. See McCall, supra note 40, at 385-99; Exculpatory Polygraphs, supra
note 127, at 100-01. In his dissent, Justice Stevens also referred to the New
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New Mexico's criminal justice system has not collapsed by
admitting polygraph evidence certainly suggests that the
fears surrounding polygraph admissibility are quite
exaggerated.
5. Widespread Acceptance Standard. Polygraph
opponents and proponents clash on the familiar
battleground of polygraph acceptance within the relevant
scientific communities. When focusing on widespread
acceptance of the polygraph, it would have behooved the
Scheffer Court to apprehend the simple truth that "the
existence of disagreement in the scientific community [is]
not a ground for exclusion under Daubert.""5 Polygraph
opponents have assiduously endeavored to skew the Court's
assessment of polygraph acceptance into polygraph
disapproval based on the very existence of the
disagreement. But disagreement per se does not indicate
that a technique does not enjoy widespread acceptance. 6
The widespread acceptance debate revolves around
which scientific community is relevant: would it be
polygraph examiners, psychophysiologists, or psycholo-
gists?27 In an attempt to answer this Daubert inquiry,
polygraph opponents and proponents cite two well-known
surveys of psychophysiologists undertaken in 1982 and
1992: the proponents uphold the survey results, 8 and the
Mexico Rule of Evidence. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 338 & n.28.
234. The outcome of an inquiry into general acceptance "depends largely on
the generality with which the question is posed." STRONG, supra note 10, at 902.
235. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Scheffer (No.-96-1133).
236. See Honts & Perry, supra note 23, at 362. "Many types of generally
accepted forensic evidence are also characterized by polemic debate... and
equivocal evidence." (citations omitted). Id. However, when applying a Frye
widespread acceptance standard, "[tihe existence of a heated controversy over
the validity of a scientific technique ordinarily precludes its admission in a Frye
jurisdiction: the controversy is the antithesis of the widespread acceptance
required by Frye." IMWINKELRIED & GARLAND, supra note 43, § 13-7, at 422.
Clearly, the plurality and concurring justices' arguments in Scheffer revolved
around the Frye standard.
237. Frye suggested that the fields of psychology and physiology should be
surveyed for general acceptance. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923). Dr. Matte explains that the relevant community would be forensic
psychophysiologists. See MATTE, supra note 10, at 3-4.
238. The 1982 survey, taken by telephone of members of the Society for
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opponents attack its methodology."9 Proponents view the
survey as proof that a majority of scientists in the relevant
community believed the control question polygraph
Psychophysiological Research (SPR), was conducted by the Gallup
Organization. The purpose of the survey was to assess general acceptance of the
polygraph in the relevant scientific community for the Wall Street Journal,
which sought to introduce polygraph evidence in a civil libel suit.
SPR is a scientific organization composed of psychologists, medical
researchers and engineers who study the relationships between
physiological reactions and psychological states, and whose members
and journal have published the majority of scientific articles
concerning polygraph techniques. Therefore, the membership of SPR
best represents the 'relevant scientific community' for determining the
validity of polygraph testing ... Approximately two-thirds of the
scientists reported favorable opinions concerning the usefulness of
polygraph tests.
The Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case for
Polygraph Tests, in FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 580-81. The 1992 survey,
conducted by Susan Amato and Charles Honts, by mail, mirrored the results of
a decade earlier. They also subdivided their respondents into a group that
considered themselves "highly informed" about the polygraph, and 83% of this
group endorsed polygraph testing. Id. at 581.
239. In response to Raskin, William Iacono and David Lykken challenge the
survey results on a number of fronts. See The Scientific Status of Research on
Polygraph Technique: The Case Against Polygraph Testing, in FAIGMAN, supra
note 8, at 612-18. They view SPR membership as constituting only part of the
relevant scientific community, with psychologists as the best qualified to assess
polygraph validity and reliability. See id. at 616. They then attack the surveys'
methodology, charging that the 1982 survey was unpublished, and provided few
details concerning how it was conducted. See id. at 612. They dismissed the
second survey by noting that only 30% of those surveyed responded, and that its
query as to whether the scientist viewed the polygraph as a "useful diagnostic
tool" did not necessarily mean that it was useful for legal proceedings. Id. at
612-13. They noted the surveys were fraught with ambiguities and did not
distinguish between what questioning technique was employed. See id. at 591,
612-14. They discussed results of a mail survey they had conducted in 1994 of
certain SPR members, of which 90% returned their questionnaires. See id. at
614. The results were startlingly divergent, with 64% denying that the Control
Question Technique was scientifically sound, and only about one-quarter of
those surveyed willing to use either passed or failed tests in court. See id. at
614-15. They also conducted a survey of "an elite group of psychologists" where
the results were similar, leading to their conclusion that "the scientific
community regards the CQT [Control Question Technique] to be an
unstandardized, nonobjective technique, based on implausible assumptions ...
and which is unlikely to achieve good accuracy in detecting either truthfulness
or deception." Id. at 616-17. Raskin, et al. in turn responded to this criticism. Id.
at 626-27.
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technique was "a useful tool when considered with other
evidence for assessing truth or deception."2
40
A recent federal district court opinion concerning
polygraph admissibility analyzed each of the Daubert
reliability factors with such competence, both scientific and
legal, that a noted polygraph expert termed United States v.
Galbreth "[tlhe most thorough published exposition of the
application of the Daubert factors to polygraph evidence. " "
The Galbreth Court held a pretrial Daubert hearing on the
defendant's motion to admit expert opinion evidence
regarding exculpatory polygraph results.' After carefully
evaluating the polygraph examiner's credentials,"3 the
technique used in the examination,m published laboratory
and field studies, 5 scoring techniques 6 and challenges to
240. United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 892 (D.N.M. 1995). The
most widely used and accepted polygraph technique involves two types of
questions: control questions and relevant questions that concern the particular
investigation. See id. at 884. Through comparative reactivity rather than
absolute reactivity to the questions, the examiner can opine as to truth or
deception. See supra note 198.
241. Daniels, supra note 128, at 18.
242. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 878.
243. The examiner was Dr. David Raskin, Professor of Psychology at the
University at Utah, a specialist in psychophysiology and one of the nation's
leading experts on and proponents of polygraphy. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at
882-83.
244. Dr. Raskin administered a Directed Lie Control Question Technique
polygraph test to the defendant (an advanced form of the Control Question
technique). See id. The Drug Enforcement Agency, various military and
intelligence agencies, the Internal Revenue Service and Department of Energy
currently use this test. See id. at 885; see also Canham, supra note 167, at 84-
85.
245. The Galbreth court extensively reviewed the scientific data underlying
the Probable Lie Control Question Technique (a generic version of the directed
lie control question technique undergone by the defendant). See 908 F. Supp. at
884. According to Dr. Raskin's testimony, the high quality studies conducted on
this technique "number in the many dozens" and support the hypothesis
underlying the technique. Id. at 885. Dr. Raskin testified about his involvement
with 12-15 laboratory studies that "produced accuracy rates in excess of 90%"
and a major field study that "yielded an accuracy rate of approximately 94-
95%." Id. at 885-87. For further discussion on laboratory and field studies, see
ABRAMS, supra note 54, at 188-201; NORMAN ANSLEY & MARCIA GARWOOD, THE
ACCURACY AND UT=/rY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING, DEPT. OF DEF. 1984, reprinted in
13 POLYGRAPH 5 (1984); FAIGMAN, supra note 8, at 570-76, 603-12; GINNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, at 225-29; STRONG, supra note 10, at 909-11;
1580 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
the polygraph technique, 7 the judge ruled that the
polygraph results were admissible.24 Galbreth added a sixth
factor to the Daubert non-exclusive reliability list: a court
must scrutinize the specific application of the scientific
technique in the case at bar as imperative to a faithful
application of Daubert.249 The Memorandum and Order
Honts & Quick, supra note 218, at 995-98; Michael Tiner & Daniel J. O'Grady,
Lie Detectors in Employment, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 85, 92-102 (1988).
246. Dr. Raskin testified that he employed a computer scoring method in
this case to evaluate test results. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 888. "The
examiner simply runs the program and the computer makes tens of thousands
of calculations within five to ten seconds." Id. This totally objective scoring
method removes one of the issues that critics charge make the polygraph test
unreliable: incorporating some of the examiner's clinical impressions of the
subject during the pretest interview and examination. This subjective
assessment, which accompanied early polygraph examinations, provoked
criticism that the examiner's interpretation of the subject's behavior was being
tested, not the subject's deception. For further information on the use of
computer algorithms to analyze physiological data collected during
Psychological Detection of Deception tests, see Yankee, supra note 11.
247. Issues involved here are the competence of the examiner, whether the
examiner may manipulate the subject and examination to produce a desired
result, whether certain personality types (such as psychopaths) can defeat the
test, and whether countermeasures (such as drugs or other physical
countermeasures) could defeat the test. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 889. Dr.
Raskin testified that studies have indicated psychopaths could not beat a
properly conducted test, and that no studies have demonstrated as of yet that
drugs were effective countermeasures against the control question technique.
See id. Concerning physical countermeasures, Dr. Raskin testified that research
has indicated that if a subject is given specific training on how to use
undetectable maneuvers (such as biting the tongue or tensing the leg muscles
during control questions), as many as 50% of subjects can produce erroneous
results. See id. at 890. However, Dr. Raskin added, and the Court found, that
because a subject "must receive highly specialized hands-on training in order to
successfully engage in countermeasures, the possibility that a subject will
succeed in such measures is very slight." Id. For further discussions on the
issue of countermeasures, see ABRAMS, supra note 54, at 185-86; FAIGMAN,
supra note 8, at 576-79, 595-96; GIANNELLI & MVMINKELRIED, supra note 11, at
229-30; LYKKEN, supra note 96, at 230-32, 273-77, 292-93; MATTE, supra note
10, at 531; Stan Abrams & Lt. Michael Davidson, Counter-Countermeasures in
Polygraph Testing, 17 POLYGRAPH 16 (1988); Charles R. Honts, et. al., Effects of
Spontaneous Countermeasures on the Physiological Detection of Deception, 16 J.
POLICE Sci. & ADMI. 91, 91-93 (1988); Honts & Perry, supra note 23, at 373-75.
248. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 895.
249. See id. at 881. The Court viewed the validity of polygraph results as not
only dependent on the general validation provided by field and laboratory
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issued by the judge provided an exhaustive account of how
the Daubert reliability factors and the relevance inquiry,
applied to the polygraph, dictated admissibility.
The Galbreth Court joined a growing number of Federal
jurisdictions which have re-evaluated previous holdings
against admission of polygraph evidence2 50 The trend has
gained momentum following Daubert. Two Circuit Courts
have reconsidered their per se rules against admissibility
and dispensed with them.'1
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 figures prominently in
post-Daubert Circuit Court decisions."52 The Tenth Circuit
held that Daubert must be applied to polygraph evidence,
though it was later excluded on a Rule 403 basis,253 while
studies for the hypothesis underlying the polygraph technique, but also
specifically dependent on certain conditions such as a properly conducted
examination by a competent examiner and utilization of standard polygraph
techniques in the particular case. See id. at 882.
250. See, e.g., John E. Theuman, Admissibility in Federal Criminal Case of
Results of Polygraph (Lie Detector) Test-Post-Daubert Cases 140 A.L.R. FED. 525
(1997) (giving an overview of relatively recent circuit and federal district court
cases concerning the polygraph).
251. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997)
(concluding its former per se rule of exclusion of polygraph evidence was
inconsistent with Daubert, the court noted that the trial court had to weigh the
probative value of the evidence against the danger of misleading the jury under
Rule 403); United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that "the rationale underlying this circuit's per se rule against admitting
polygraph evidence did not survive Daubert," and finding that Rule 403 would
also govern admissibility). Both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits updated these
decisions, providing more guidance concerning polygraph admissibility in a
post-per se rule era. See United States v. Elkwachi, 111 F.3d 139 (9th Cir.
1997). While noting that polygraph results were not per se inadmissible, the
Ninth Circuit upheld exclusion of the evidence as within the trial court's
discretion. See id. The Fifth Circuit updated Posado in United States v.
Pettigrew 77 F.3d 1500 (5th Cir. 1996). The court observed that the inquiry
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is a flexible one, where admissibility
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Pettigrew, 77 F.3d at 1515.
In this case, while the court opined that it did not "sanction efforts to 'short
circuit' the Daubert analysis," it found the polygraph examiner's questions
irrelevant and thus inadmissible. Id.
252. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 reads, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
253. See United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting its
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the Second Circuit, though declining to hold that the
polygraph was admissible under Rule 702, ruled it
inadmissible under Rule 403.254 The Eighth Circuit held
that a proper foundation under Daubert must be laid for
expert testimony on the polygraph, but excluded the
testimony pursuant to Rule 403. " Another Circuit
acknowledged that Daubert required them to review their
holdings disallowing polygraph results, but the test was
excluded since the defendant had sought the relief without
proper notice to the opposing party.25
categorical rule of exclusion, the court went on to uphold the trial courts
exclusion of polygraph evidence under Rule 403). The Scheffer Court's disregard
of Daubert prompted one of the amici to write:
Unfortunately, Daubert has not served to change the ultimate reality of
per se exclusionary practices. The major change in many post-Daubert
cases has not been a change toward acceptance of the consequences of
the opinion, but rather has been a shift in the stated rationales for
what are, in effect, continued per se refusals to admit the polygraph
evidence.
Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8, Scheffer (No. 96-1133). Courts
inhospitable to the polygraph have used Rule 403 discretion and other
exclusionary theories. See generally IMWILPKEIRED & MCCALL, supra note 41
(explaining that courts have rejected the admissibility of polygraph evidence
because of its tendency to prejudice or mislead the jury).
254. See United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995). The court
faulted the polygrapher for asking questions that were "inherently ambiguous
no matter how they were answered," which led to their conclusion that
admission of the defendant's answers would mislead and confuse the jury,
"outweighing any probative value they may have [had]." Id. at 668. In United
States v. Messina 131 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied _ U.S. -, 118
S.Ct. 1546 (1998), the panel noted that the Second Circuit had not "decided
whether polygraphy has reached a sufficient state of reliability to be admissible
under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence," perhaps representing an
ever-so-slight loosening of the Circuit's traditional anti-polygraph position. Id.
255. See United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that
the polygrapher's questions concerned peripheral details about the crime and
that because of that infirmity, the judge did not abuse his discretion in
disallowing the evidence under Rule 403). The Eighth Circuit permits
polygraph evidence if stipulated to by both parties prior to the test. See
Anderson v. United States, 788 F.2d 517, 520 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986).
256. The Sixth Circuit relaxed its per se rule against admissibility of
polygraph related evidence in limited circumstances where "it is relevant to the
proof developed by the probative evidence." United States v. Wright, 22 F. Supp.
2d 751, 753 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (citing Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970, 972 (6th
Cir. 1987)). However, the circuit later circumscribed that opening. See United
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Only the D.C. and Fourth Circuits do not allow
polygraph evidence under any circumstances, holding fast
to the seventy-six year old Frye standard.25
The Eleventh Circuit was the first to counter the
polygraph inadmissibility rule, even before Daubert, and
has allowed polygraph evidence for ten years.258 The
remaining circuits allow polygraph results to be admitted if
a proper foundation is laid, 9 or appear to allow it only
under particular circumstances. 6 '
The majority of state courts, not required to follow the
Daubert standard for admissibility of scientific evidence
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, continue to
follow the Frye "general acceptance" standard for expert
States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that unilateral
polygraph examination was inadmissible, particularly since it would have
dubious probative value); Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir.
1994) (stating that "unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never
admissible under Evidence Rule 403."), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1082 (1995). The
Sixth Circuit adroitly and consistently declined to address the effect of Daubert
on its holdings concerning the polygraph. See United States v. Thomas, 167
F.3d 299, 309 n.8 (6th Cir. 1999).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997)
(adhering to the circuit's per se rule prohibiting introduction of polygraph
evidence). The Sanchez court observed that in a previous decision, United States
v. Toth, 91 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit suggested it may be
possible to change the prohibition against polygraph evidence without approval
of the en banc court in light of Daubert, but declined to reach the issue. Id. at
197 n.3.
258. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989)
(allowing polygraph expert testimony when stipulated to in advance; allowing
such testimony when used to impeach or corroborate witness upon proper
notice). After carefully reviewing scientific evidence on the polygraph, the court
concluded, "It is unwise to hold fast to a familiar rule [against polygraph
admissibility] when the basis for that rule ceases to be persuasive." Id. at 1537.
259. See United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 433-34 (1st Cir. 1988)
(requiring judge's discretion); see also United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192 (7th
Cir. 1995) (allowing polygraph pursuant to judge's discretion). In Pulido, the
Seventh Circuit cited its position of having "persistently refused to adopt [a per
se rule against admissibility of polygraphs], choosing rather to leave the
decision on admissibility to the sound discretion of the district court." Id. at 205
(quoting United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied 446 U.S. 954 (1980)).
260. See United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 1987)
(appearing to allow polygraph evidence in rebuttal, introduced here to rebut
assertion of coerced confession).
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scientific testimony, thereby maintaining case law
roadblocks against polygraph admissibility." ' One rule of
thumb to follow for those seeking to find some sort of
consistency in the polygraph admissibility quagmire was
proposed by two noted experts in the field: "acceptance or
rejection of the evidence by the courts hinges on each
judge's perspective on the accuracy of the technique."2 2
CONCLUSION
Despite Daubert's clear mandate to assess scientific
expert testimony according to more liberal evidentiary
rules, prejudice against the polygraph, evidenced in
Scheffer, retains a stranglehold on the evidentiary process.
Ignoring Daubert's guidelines for evaluating scientific
261. For states that exclude polygraph evidence per se, see Pulakis v. State,
476 P.2d 474, 477 (Alaska 1970); Haakanson v. State, 760 P.2d 1030, 1035
(Alaska Ct. App. 1988); People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 361 (Colo. 1981) (en
banc); State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 750 (Conn. 1997); State v. Okumura, 894
P.2d 80 (Haw. 1995); People v. Sanchez, 662 N.E.2d 1199, 1210 (Ill. 1996);
Morton v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1991); State v. Harnish,
560 A.2d 5, 8 (Me. 1989); State v. Hawkins, 604 A.2d 489, 492 (Md. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35, 36 (Mass. 1989); People v. Davis, 72
N.W.2d 269, 281-82 (Mich. 1955); State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986); State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 185
(Mo. 1980); State v. Staat, 811 P.2d 1261, 1261 (Mont. 1991); State v.
Steinmark, 239 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Neb. 1976); In re Grimm, 635 A.2d 456, 464
(N.H. 1993); People v. Angelo, 666 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (N.Y. 1996); State v.
Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351, 356 (N.C. 1983); Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1975); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 772 (Or. 1984); Commonwealth
v. Brockington, 455 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. 1983); In re Odell, 672 A.2d 457, 459 (R.I.
1996); State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 588 (S.D. 1985); State v. Hart, 911
S.W.2d 371, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Perkins v. State, 902 S.W.2d 88, 95
(Tex. App. 1995); State v. Hamlin, 499 A.2d 45, 54 (Vt. 1985); Robinson v.
Commonwealth, 341 S.E.2d 159, 167 (Va. 1986); State v. Beard, 461 S.E.2d 486,
491 (W.Va. 1995); State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 653 (Wisc. 1981).
Furthermore, Washington, D.C., home of the Frye decision, bars polygraph
evidence. See Contee v. United States, 667 A.2d 103, 104 n.4 (D.C. 1995). Other
states admit polygraph evidence by stipulation of the parties; two states allow
polygraph evidence to be admitted in certain proceedings; and Mississippi and
New Mexico allow admission of polygraph evidence, with restrictions, during a
trial. For a listing of states that fall into these latter categories, see Brief of the
State of Connecticut and 27 States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
4-6, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
262. Honts & Perry, supra note 23, at 369.
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expert testimony, and using instead a variant of the
overruled 'general acceptance' standard, the Scheffer Court
maintained the polygraph's status as imprisoned without
parole in a Fryean dungeon. Seventy-five years of scholarly
and technological progress in psychophysiology and its
measurement count for naught. With this finding, the Court
underscored the polygraph's unique status as an
illegitimate offspring of the scientific revolution. A cursory
comparison with other genres of scientific evidence quickly
reveals that the Supreme Court does not require the same
near-perfect accuracy rate for other types of scientific
evidence as it demands for the polygraph.263 Even if the
polygraph proved to be 100% reliable, opponents would still
argue against its admissibility.2"
Not even constitutional protections can penetrate the
wall of polygraph prejudice. The same government that
administers hundreds of thousands of polygraph
examinations, some of which determine the most critical
issues of national security, hypocritically argues that, in a
legal context, per se rules excluding polygraph results serve
a legitimate interest of ensuring that only reliable evidence
is introduced at trial."5 Despite Rock's unequivocal holding
which condemned per se rules excluding a defendant's
evidence as unconstitutional, the Scheffer Court latched on
to Rock's peripheral language acknowledging limits on
presentation of relevant evidence. Using that rationale, the
263. "A great deal of lay testimony routinely admitted is at least as
unreliable and inaccurate [as the polygraph], and other forms of scientific
evidence involve risks of instrumental or judgmental error." STRONG, supra note
10, at 915 & n.57.
264. During the oral argument before Supreme Court, this exchange
between counsel for the United States and Justice Stevens indicated that high
polygraph reliability, the gravamen of the written briefs, would still not be
enough to admit polygraph evidence. "The Court: Your position, as I understand
it is, even if it were totally reliable, you would still take the same position, it's
inadmissible? Mr. Dreeben: I do, Justice Stevens." Transcript of Oral Argument
Before the United States Supreme Court at 14, Scheffer (No. 96-1133).
265. See Winemiller, supra note 94, at 349 (stating that "[a]lthough the
polygraph is not perfect, the Department of Defense considers it to be one of its
'most effective investigative tools' and uses it tens of thousands of times each
year. To dismiss as irrelevant a kind of expert opinion on which crucial matters
of confidence-even national security-rely borders on capriciousness, especially




Court circumscribed the rights of the accused, betrayed its
precedent and broke faith with the liberal spirit of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Consequently, valid, reliable,
helpful and arguably outcome determinative evidence did
not reach Scheffer's jury. The trial judge, as gatekeeper,
was stymied by a "blunderbuss"266 evidentiary rule that
prevented even a foundation from being laid to explore
admissibility issues.6 7 The Court effectively marooned a
standard it promulgated a generation earlier: "[B]y denying
an accused the opportunity to present exculpatory
testimony, an exclusionary evidentiary rule calls into
question the ultimate 'integrity of the fact-finding
ls p268process. That premise and promise of American
constitutional law rings hollow in the wake of Scheffer.
Given the slow but sure inroads the polygraph has
made at the circuit court level, what is now needed is
time-time for those more accommodating circuit court
opinions to trickle down to federal trial courts and perhaps
even to state courts. While the erosion of the polygraph
admissibility bar continues to take place, the case
anticipated by the Scheffer concurring justices may soon
prompt reconsideration of this issue by the Court.
266. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 338 (illustrating Justice Stevens' term for the per
se rule excluding polygraph evidence).
267. Numerous courts cited Scheffer as sufficient precedent to shut the door
in cases where defendants sought a right to a hearing to determine the
admissibility of polygraph evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 1998 WL
743500 (A.F.Ct. Crim. App. 1998); United States v. Fortner, 48 M.J. 882, 884
(1998) (describing a case where the defendant claimed the trial court erred she
he could not introduce polygraph evidence showing his confession was
involuntary); Milas v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 704 (1999) (describing a case
where a defendant sought to show the polygraph was reliable). The post-
Scheffer anti-polygraph drumbeat continued in cases where courts hardened
their lines concerning what evidence submitted by a defendant was
constitutionally required to be admitted. See, e.g., United States v. Velez, 48
M.J. 220 (1998); State v. Karlen, 589 N.W.2d 594 (S.D. 1999). In other cases,
some courts determined that exclusion of polygraph evidence did not violate a
defendant's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Mayabb v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 863,
869-70 (5th Cir. 1999), Castillo v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 218, 222 (5th Cir., 1998),
State v. Grossberg, No. 9611007818, 1998 WL 283470 (Del. Super. Apr. 2,
1999), State v. Council, No. 24932, 1999 WL 184099 (S.C. Apr. 5, 1999).
268. IhnWINLRIED & GARLAND, supra note 43, at 495 (citing Justice
Powell's opinion in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
[Vol. 471586
